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1 Introduction: collective action, social innovation and COMETS’ 
ambition 
Collective action stands as a foundation for social life. Any action of any member of the social body is 
wrapped in bundles of collective action, which involve agents, and agencies of different nature. 
Collective action is the foundational element of any mode of existence, bad or good, wrong or right, 
and the way in which it organizes makes any collective, a singular entity. 
Collective action produces collective goods. The potential free-rider problem as collective action 
configuration presupposes is not important here. The free-rider problem has been extensively 
considered by utilitarians due to the heavy reliance utilitarianism implies on methodological 
individualism. Even if there are free-riders, they can be there just because there is a common good, 
or collective good or even also a public good. We know that free-riding can threat the integrity and 
functionality of the common good, but as it has been historically demonstrated, any collective good 
has its own antibodies. Thus, the first consequence of collective action is a collective good, and such 
a good, as in the case of energy, is not appropriable or eligible to be privatized for individual profit 
and utility. The production of collective goods also means that people who are engaged in collective 
action can collectively control and own the collective good, which is managed in a common way and 
produces welfare (rather than profit) for the collective and beyond. 
It is widely recognized that for the energy transition to be effectively pushed, the active engagement 
of various social actors in designing and implementing renewable sources and technologies play – 
and should play - a crucial role. This is true both in the designing and implementation, as well as in 
grasping and satisfying, of social needs and concerns related to energy. But a truly active engagement 
may be reached by challenging the current energy regime through strategies and processes that 
might give large companies or technical systems a lesser role. Thus, a claim is made for finding 
innovative processes to allow people – either formal citizens or not - to actually take part in the 
decision-making processes collectively and, at the same time, to be able to drive improvement in 
society, both by satisfying current needs and by creating new opportunities for people to act - to 
produce social innovation. In this deliverable, we will take a starting point to investigate social 
innovation processes, conditions and outcomes of the definition provided by Hubert et al. (2010) "as 
new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively 
than alternatives) and create new social relationships or collaborations. In other words, they are 
innovations that are not only good for society but also enhance society’s capacity to act.“ 
But how does collective action connect with social innovation? The collective action that produces 
new types of goods or commons or is able to restore old commons that had been monopolized, 
captured by market forces or privatized, is social innovation. New collective goods, new common 
goods, are social innovation per se because they counteract privatization and individualization, and 
because they promote new community interactions and consider a wider definition of social welfare 
than traditional approaches, which helps fuel the growth of these initiatives. Here, social innovation, 
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as in the case of the innovation that follows new energy collective goods, is sculpted by principles of 
environmental and social justice, inclusion, poverty alleviation and resource sharing as a form of 
mutual support. All of which generate social welfare. Social innovation, thus, means that a new social 
configuration is needed to manage the new collective good produced by collective action. Here the 
act of communing also implies the structure for managing the new commons (governance aspects). 
In this framework, it is worth to recall here that by ‘transition’ in the energy system it should be 
considered not only the transition from a centralized/fossils-based system to a more 
decentralized/renewables-based system, but also the more complex transformation of a private good 
(as energy currently is) to a different type of collective/common good, owned and/or managed 
and/or exploited by wider groups of cooperating people to increase common welfare. This 
‘commonalization’ of energy is a process, implicitly innovative in itself, able to push further 
innovative adaptation of the socio-economic structure. In a word, a deep grassroots social innovation 
that, starting from the very local level (micro), can potentially upscale through complex mechanism 
of interaction (imitation, diffusion, etc.) to an overall transformation of the system at the global, 
aggregate level (macro). 
COMETS thus has the ambition to conceptualize and further solidify the triangulation of collective 
action, collective goods and social innovation, intended as a way to manage the new commons 
revived by the action of citizens. 
With respect to the high ambition of the project, the ambition and the objectives of the present 
deliverable are key for the basis of the width of the scientific production throughout the duration of 
the project. The variety of experiences all around Europe refer to collective perspective and the 
heterogeneity of COMETS partners. This deliverable is intended as an exploratory exercise aimed at 
providing a theoretically and methodologically starting point for the following research steps to be 
taken. That starting point will be a provisional shared definition of CAI (Collective Action Initiative) 
in the energy system, that is to be updated along the way (on the basis of further research results). 
The deliverable is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical debate that has been developed 
for the last century around collective action is taken into account and the most relevant perspectives 
to look at collective action are explored. In Section 3, focus is provided on the relevance of the 
collective approach in the field of energy, with specific attention paid to the related social aspects 
(impact and innovation processes). Here, the main results of a focus group involving the COMETS 
Consortium are presented jointly with a list of collective experiences in energy intended as an 
illustration useful to define the boundaries of COMETS object of research. Finally, Section 4 explores 
the main internal and external conditions that may support/challenge CAI development. This section 
proposes a first set of dimensions to be accounted for in order to provide a description of CAIs 
characteristics, development and effects. Finally, Section 5 will summarize the main findings. 
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2 Collective action: a theoretical perspective 
2.1 Collective action, the basis of social life 
Collective action is a perennial problem for social and philosophical sciences. For instance, collective 
action is at the base of Hobbes social contract as a rational way to escape conflicts and wars. Spinoza 
investigated collective action as a mode of human rationality. In a certain sense, Spinoza built a 
solution to any collective action problem into his definition of rational human nature. The rational 
individual is someone who realizes that his or her nature cannot be fulfilled except in society. This 
awareness inevitably leads individuals to cooperate with others on a rational basis. In a broad sense, 
collective action is the solution that humans embrace to cope with problems that are individually 
unsolvable (Rosenthal, 1998). 
This leads to the centrality of collective action for the social realm. It is one of the core constituent 
elements of social life, in other words it may greatly contribute to a social ontology (Schatzki, 2003). 
We assume that collective action and not individual action is fundamental to social life. It does not 
imply that we are not aware of the free-rider problem or the problem of individual agency. Instead, 
this emerges when collective action is scarcely effective or when new social configurations push 
people to act and to perceive their action individually, thus challenging the different collective bodies 
that regulate social life. It also contends that collective action can go beyond the line that theorists 
have traditionally relied on in demarcating the social against the material (Schatzki, 2010). COMETS 
not only focuses on collective action as one of the basic features or structures of social realm, but also 
focuses on a peculiar object or site of collective action: production, distribution and use of energy. 
This implies a couple of challenges: on one side, we try to explain how collective action can manage 
a material thing such as energy without delegating it to complex, large and often bureaucratic 
organizations operating in the field of energy. This is a crucial aspect of our investigation: at the end, 
as we understand it, large bureaucratic organizations are not collective action. Their governance is 
based on indirect representation, rather than direct participation to day-to-day management. 
Decision power is distributed on the basis of shareholding/voting rights associated to capital 
invested or other historical rights for veto (i.e. private property and exclusivity, rather than inclusion 
and openness). In this sense, collective action entails a radical social innovation in the field of the 
management of natural resources, such as energy. On the other side, we aim at demonstrating that 
action (and collective action mainly) is not done under the full control of consciousness. Action 
should rather be seen as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that 
have to be slowly disentangled (Latour, 2005). It is a continuous source of uncertainty that has to be 
explained. In few words, we are trying to investigate what makes all of us do the same thing at the 
same time, in the same space (even social or physical) for the same goal. Agencies and actors are not 
the point of departure to explain collective action in the energy transition, but rather what have to 
be explained1. 
 
1 In this document we refer to actors, agents and agency in a very interchangeable way. However, we know that 
around concept such as ‘agency’ there was and there still is a very large debate. We do not held a very clear 
preference about different definitions of agency, but we prefer those that implies the enlarging of the notion to 
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Among many other issues, collective action poses other intriguing dilemmas of social life that are also 
in question in COMETS: why, despite of being a constituent element of social life, does collective 
action appear as a mere sum of individual acts? Additionally, why does it often solidify into 
institutions, bureaucracy, and organizations, losing its systemic dynamics? A more trivial dilemma 
regards the question of whether individuals acting collectively get or gain more compared with acting 
via individual acts. Often, collective action is seen as the mere sum of individual acts or the chaotic 
bundle of individualized practices, for example in the case of the race toward ‘positional goods’. Since 
not all can have, in the positional sector, what someone can have, this race for goods is accompanied 
by a distributional struggle that exacerbates the social tensions rather than heightens social 
integration, thus generating a new beggar-my-neighbour (Hirsch, 1977). In the case of energy, the 
dilemma to be solved is if people acting together can simultaneously satisfy their own individual 
energy needs or preferences while contributing to solve a common problem like that of global heating 
or the environmental crises. Often, these cases of collective action dilemma are not win-win 
situations, thus people must choose what course of action they pick: if in favour of an anonymous 
collective or in favour of themselves.  
In many cases, people act collectively also because they are disappointed by the behaviour of their 
energy provider and decide to take a new path, leaving it and taking their faith in their own hands. 
This latter, showed by Albert Hirschman (1970), is a pure case of exit in which people as customers 
or voters, instead of voicing or remaining loyal to their provider, party, or company, decide to 
experience new practices and strategies of goods provision for better common welfare. In short, by 
collective action, we might mean the choice by all or most individuals of the course of action that, 
when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the collectively best (expected) outcome. This course 
of action can be also referred to as cooperative behaviour (Elster, 1985). 
2.2 The power of collective action 
Not all the scholars who investigate the energy transition acknowledge the potentiality of collective 
action to challenge the current energy system. Some see collective action only as a more efficient and 
perhaps rational way to manage energy but do not fully recognise its power. The collective is energy. 
If we focus on the historical conjuncture at the turn of the twentieth century, we can notice how 
 
collective action. Agency has been usually defined as the capacity of a single agent – namely an individual – to 
act and choose courses of action in line with his/her will. A very early definition (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) 
states that agency is a “temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its 
‘iterational’ or habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a ‘projective’ capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a ‘practical-evaluative’ capacity to contextualize past 
habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment)”. However, our interest is devoted to the 
collective agency, whereas an autonomous capacity to act and change the world is proper of a collective of 
individuals that act univocally. Collective agency is supposed to be formed by a number of other agents that 
enact in such a way that a collective emerges as a living singularity. The enactive theory of agency (Froese and 
Di Paolo, 2011) explores the concept of collective agency with the ideas of multi-agent systems and multi-
system agents and argues that a genuine collective agency would instantiate agency at both the collective level 
and at the level of its component parts. Moreover, a genuine collective action is able to generate its own internal 
or endogenous normativity. Our perspective enlarges this vision anchored on biological paradigms such as 
autopoiesis, by integrating the genuine collective action with other dimensions explained in the document. 
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theorists in the humanities and social sciences were engaging with energetics and thermodynamic 
theory in their work. Following the radical developments of nineteenth-century physics, 
philosophers, sociologists, and literary authors reconceived ‘non-material’ phenomena (mind, 
society, culture) as part of the natural world through related concepts of energy, force, vibration, and 
rhythm. An energetic materialism emerged in which scholars reimagined matter as energy and 
contended with the dynamic relationships this ontology implied. While dynamic and developmental 
accounts of nature are often associated with evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century, we can 
say that the science of energy contributed equally to a metaphysics of transformation. The Henri 
Bergson’s theory of mind and matter, Emile Durkheim’s theory of the social, Henry Adams’s theory 
of history can be seen as important developments in twentieth-century thought aimed to revise the 
notions of matter and interaction by elaborating them in a new discourse of energetic materialism 
(Badia, 2014). Energy communities are also energetic communities in the sense that the collective 
action from which they rise is social power by definition, even if it is exerted through the control of 
devices and apparatuses aimed to capture and convert energy, a control that has consequences for 
the collective action itself. The perspective pursued here aims to emphasise the power of people 
instead of the power from technical devices. 
We can underline the fact that collective action in its different configurations can affect the 
development of countries, influencing their fate of growth or decline, as suggested by Mancur Olson 
(1982). Of course, collective action has not a predefined direction: it can support or help different 
groups often conflicting each other. In other words, collective action is the strategy to affirm interests 
of one social side against another one. From another point of view, collective action is that strategy 
that favours individualistic behaviour represented by the free rider metaphor. If, as suggested by 
Olson, individuals will only choose to join a group if the private benefits offered exceed the costs of 
their personal commitment (Olson, 1965), thus the free-rider strategy remains more plausible for 
people. Each neighbour would like to enjoy the undoubted utility/income that arises from draining 
without himself having to shoulder his shovel and drain. What one can do, however, all cannot; for it 
is the central tenet of the economics of shirking that, as Arthur Stinchcombe (1980) explains, “each 
one is better off if he or she gets a salary without working, but all are worse off in a society of slackers”. 
The optimal scenario for the would-be slacker involves a society in which all citizens are co-
operators; the worst scenario involves a society in which all operate egoistically (Riesman, 1990). 
Three possible devices that people use to solve the prisoner’s dilemma are the following: those who 
choose non-cooperative strategies get a bad reputation and so learn to be cooperative; those who are 
taught by parents that non-co-operators have unhappy lives; or that an official can be paid a salary 
to make the cooperative choice (Stinchcombe, 1980). These devices result in people often solving 
prisoners' dilemma games without being conscious of them. The structures that have the function of 
solving social dilemmas are created and maintain themselves as socio-material devices made of 
organizational, consciousness, and technical aspects. 
Olson developed an ambitious attempt to synthesise the topics of growth and development, efficiency 
and flexibility, free trade and involuntary unemployment, and to correlate them with the size and 
power of the special-interest groups, which comprise the corporate society. Olson's central 
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conclusion is stated in terms of group size: large groups will fail; small groups may succeed (Reisman, 
1990). Olson causal explanation of the rise and decline of nations in the light of collective action is 
too huge and often misleading to be used here, but it can be useful in some way. Let us consider for 
instance the altruistic attitudes about observable outcomes or results and suppose an individual 
would be willing to sacrifice some leisure or other personal consumption to obtain some amount of 
a collective good because of an altruistic concern that others should have this collective good. This 
individual's preference ordering takes account of the collective good obtained by others as well as of 
personal consumption. This assumption of altruism does not imply irrationality, or a tendency to 
make choices that are inconsistent with the maximal satisfaction of the values or preferences the 
individual has. On the contrary, as in the case of energy communities and other CAIs we are going to 
investigate, this is a rational choice aimed to bring well-being to everybody while reducing GHGs 
emissions. Ostrom holds many structural variables postulated by Olson for having collective action, 
but she develops also a critique of them (Ostrom, 2010). Focusing on structural variables that make 
collective action possible, she includes: the number of participants involved; whether benefits are 
subtractive or fully shared (i.e., public goods vs common-pool resources); the heterogeneity of 
participants. How size might affect the likelihood of cooperation depends on how other structural 
variables are affected by the size of a group (see Ostrom, 2001). In the case of subtractiveness of 
goods, she criticizes Olson because for her the common-pool resources are subtractable in nature. 
She also includes the problems of overharvesting and crowding, present for example among 
important types of collective pool resources including forests, water systems, and pastures. 
Differently from the pure model of collective pool resource, energy is a natural good mediated by 
socio-technical regime. Consequently, it can be seen as a hybrid that shares both the feature of public 
and collective goods and of the common-pool resources. By definition, public goods and common 
pool resources are both non-excludable. The main difference is their rivalry property: public goods 
can be consumed without reducing availability for others, while consuming common-pool resources 
will decrease the available resources for others. From the point of view of heterogeneity, Olson 
(1965) argued that if there were one or a few individuals who had much stronger interests in 
achieving a public good, the probability of a group achieving a public good increased even though the 
good was still likely to be underprovided. Others have speculated that heterogeneity in assets, 
information, and payoffs are negatively related to cooperation due principally to increased 
transaction costs, as well as the conflict that would exist over the distribution of benefits and costs. 
For Ostrom there are many arguments that point to heterogeneity as a serious deterrent to 
cooperation (Ostrom, 2010). 
Collective action can present different aspects that can threat its feasibility, but at the same time, it is 
restorative of the supportive society. Whereas market and money relations take the place of more 
organic social bonds, collective action helps to cope with two social facts underlined by Fred Hirsch 
(1977) and that are of primary significance for COMETS. Firstly, social frustration. Once economic 
growth brings mass consumption to the point where it causes problems of congestion, pollution, and 
scarcity – or, said bluntly, where consumption or jobholding by others tends to crowd one out — then 
the key to personal well-being is again the ability to stay ahead of the crowd. Generalized growth 
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then increases the crush. Thus, the frustration in affluence results from its very success in satisfying 
previously dominant material needs. Hence, the paradox of affluence. It embodies a distributional 
compulsion, which in turn leads to individualism. Strictly speaking, the individual benefit from the 
isolated action is clear-cut, but the sum of benefits of all the actions taken together is nonetheless 
zero. The only way of avoiding the competition in frustration is for concerned people to coordinate 
their objectives in some explicit way, departing from the principle of isolated individual striving in 
this sphere. That is to say, that only a collective approach to the problem can offer individuals the 
guidance necessary to achieve a solution they themselves would prefer. Secondly, waste. In a world 
of scarce positional goods, resources must be wasted on defensive consumption, as in the case of 
sprawling suburbs - where the desire of more and more people to live in the suburbs leads to reduced 
access to air and open space for the inhabitants of present suburbs, and consequently to an increasing 
wastage of time and energy in an attempt to reach a destination ever more distant from the 
downtown cultural and occupational opportunities. These are cases of waste, which means either 
more input for the same output, or even more input for an inferior output. In the case of energy, it is 
particularly true whereas the perpetuation of consumption as individual behaviour will never cope 
with the fossils’ shortage or the renewables’ intermittence. 
The arguments of Olson, Hirsch, and Ostrom introduce the question of collective goods that emerge 
from collective action. Energy, as managed by collective action, emerges as a collective good, whose 
permanence requires strong conditions, as we are going to show in the next section of this report. A 
simplified but useful definition of a collective good, as distinguished from an individual good, is that 
its 'consumption' by one individual does not reduce the possibility for other individuals to 'consume' 
it. Another useful distinction is between public goods and commons/common goods – the shared 
resources which people manage by negotiating their own rules through social or customary 
traditions, norms and practices. The case of renewable energy fits well with both collective good and 
common good definitions. 
2.3 Theoretical models for investigating collective action 
Collective action is resurfacing as a fundamental topic of social science investigation to explain social 
phenomena, such as social change or renovated forms of movements’ mobilization (see for example 
Willer, 2009). Literature usually presents many theoretical models to explain collective action. 
Russell Hardin, for example, looks to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the 
models find quite hopeless (Hardin, 1982). He uses three constructs of modern political economy - 
public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory - to test public choice theories against real 
world examples of collective action. Others, for instance, starting from an institutional public choice 
analysis of public participation in terms of the collective action problem, emphasise the roots of 
participatory activities in the incentive structures facing potential participants. Other ones then go 
on to consider the strategies that may be adopted for encouraging greater public involvement 
distinguishing three different modes of environmental planning, in terms of the rationale for 
participation, the severity of the collective action problem and the associated participatory strategy 
that can be adopted (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). 
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Among contemporary approaches, Resource Mobilization theory sees the emergence and 
development of movements as arising from the availability and use of resources, such as skill, money, 
labour, and so on (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McCarthy and Zald, 2001; for a critique see Jasper, 2004). 
It looks primarily at how networks of people, professionals, leadership, permanent organizations, 
incentives, and cost–benefit calculations come together to generate direct, measurable impacts on 
political and social issues. It argues that the success of social movements or collectives depends on 
resources (time, money, skills, etc.) and the ability to use them, and thus mainly focuses on 
sociological variables. This approach takes into account influences from outside, such as support 
from various organizations or the government. Resource mobilization theory extends its analysis of 
collective participation and mobilization to expectancy-value theory. It is assumed that the 
willingness to participate in a social movement is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of 
participation. Expectations about the behavior of others are seen as an important expansion of the 
expectancy-value theory and make this framework applicable to movement participation. 
(Klandermans, 1984). 
Political Opportunity Structure theory studies the impact of structure on collective action, and vice 
versa. It highlights the role of the political system, the larger social environment and culture, in the 
emergence, dynamics and outcomes of social movements. It argues that social movements must be 
studied within their particular, societal, political and cultural contexts, and it is able to show how 
‘open’ or ‘closed’ political systems affect the nature and tactics of collective actors, how they create 
new possibilities, or provoke or radicalize forms of collective action. Tarrow (1996: 54) defines the 
concept as the “political opportunity structure, I refer to consistent - but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national - signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage 
them to use their internal resources to form social movements”. This is also a perspective that will 
be accounted in this document.  
Frame Theory studies the role of the shared assumptions and meanings held by actors in interpreting 
events and redressing problems. It seeks to explain collective action in terms of the motives, beliefs 
and discourses manifested by actors. It focuses on how frames are produced and utilized during 
different phases of a movement, and on how ideas, sentiments and culture affect the repertoires of 
action and contention. It points to the functions of ideology, its ambivalence and implications for 
supporters, counter movements and authorities. It argues the pertinent role of language, leadership, 
social movement organizations and the media in framing processes. 
However, collective action requires a longer outlook to understand its roots in social thought. Charles 
Tilly, who combines the first two approaches presented above, discusses four types of collective 
action coming from different sociological traditions: Marxian, Durkheimian (structuralist), Millian 
(utilitarian) and Weberian (Tilly, 1978).  
The classic Marxist analysis derives shared interests from the common position in the organization 
of production and consumption system, changes in interest from shifts in the organization of this 
system. Any set of people in a common relationship to the means of production and consumption 
form a class, but classes vary greatly in internal structure and common consciousness. Shared aims 
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and beliefs emerge from shared interests, as mediated by the internal structure and its relationship 
to other classes. This perspective thus suggests that collective action results from shared interests as 
mediated by changing classes internal structure and the relationship to other ones. This profound 
change in class structure can be easily seen whereas we think at the global consequences of different 
crises that marked recent decades. Ecological crisis is undoubtedly generating new forms of class 
consciousness at the global level. 
The basic Durkheimian idea presents a society stressed by a continuous struggle between forces of 
disintegration (notably, rapid differentiation) and forces of integration (notably, new or renewed 
commitment to shared beliefs), between innovation and tradition. From the basic notion, Durkheim 
derives models of three different kinds of collective action: let us call them routine, anomic, and 
restorative. Routine collective action goes on in the area of the conventional or normal processes of 
social reproduction, devoted to routinely renewing shared beliefs. Anomic collective action increases 
as the society slides down from the routine whereas dynamics of social differentiation, 
complexification, and reaction occur. Anomic collective action can be seen as both positive and 
negative processes of innovation and change, both in any case shaking shared beliefs and structures. 
Restorative collective action occurs whereas processes of normalization move the society back into 
the conventional mode of existence or ways of living. This prospect has been very familiar during the 
past years when social sciences were rather focused on functional and structural dynamics of social 
systems. A prominent even unconscious supporter of this vision was Fred Hirsch, which underlines 
how the so-called moral nexus is under threat when society becomes more and more affluent. The 
decline in friendliness and increase in selfishness is properly the consequence of the increasing 
affluence, the marketization of social reciprocity, and the expansion of monetary exchange for 
collective reproduction.  
John Stuart Mill and the utilitarians represent the treatment of collective action as a strictly 
calculating pursuit of individual interest. The argument of the logic of collective action is here based 
on the strong assumption that individual actions are motivated by self-interest, or on the assumption 
of what we can call narrow rationality. This perspective underlies the individual acquiescing in a set 
of binding political arrangements (the government, the rules of the game, or some system of 
cooperation) at the expense of some personal short-run interests, in order to ensure the pursuit of 
those interests in the long run. The clearest contemporary expressions of this view appear in the 
models of collective choice: the determinants of alternative outcomes in situations in which two or 
more parties make choices affecting the outcomes. In a sense, all of microeconomics deals with 
collective choice. Microeconomic models have been the best developed and most popular in the field. 
In Max Weber's treatment, groups commit themselves to collective definitions of the world and of 
themselves. The definitions incorporate goals, entail standards of behaviour, and include 
justifications for the power of authorities. Collectives sometimes act on the basis of their traditional 
roles, sometimes on the basis of their rational/legal designation as agents for the group and 
sometimes on the basis of the charisma of their leader(s). The bases the group adopts strongly affects 
its organization and its fate. In Weber's account, the structure and action of the group as a whole 
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spring largely from the initial commitment to a particular kind of belief system. Beliefs have their 
own logic and force. Weber offered his fullest account of the origins of the fundamental beliefs in his 
discussions of religion and of charisma. According to Weber, whereas many people, for whatever 
reason, find that the new definitions of the world provide more coherent answers to the problem of 
meaning they face than do the old definitions already available to them, they join and the group 
expands. Then the group as a whole faces the problem of the ‘routinization of charisma’.  
The theories at hand clearly lead in different directions. Several are rather oriented towards a 
collective ontology; others are oriented towards an individual ontology. In many areas they are too 
incomplete to permit decisive testing against the facts. Where they are well-specified, it often turns 
out that they are talking about different things: theories of collective choice apply to situations in 
which the alternatives are limited and well-defined, theories of collective behavior refer to what 
happens when the standard choices are suspended. These aspects are relevant for COMETS, because 
the increasing interest in new social forms of energy organization discloses the limits of the current 
energy global system itself. The strategies to cope with it can be very different, for example focusing 
on choice is different from focusing on action. 
Thus, we can get different approaches for our task and they can also be merged together. Theories in 
the tradition of Mill deal mainly with exchange systems (those in which the thrust for people to act 
collectively is the desirable return that someone else will give them). Durkheimian theories deal 
mainly with integration systems (those in which the collective action is built upon a sense of common 
fate or identity). Weber's line emphasizes threat systems (those in which the emerging collective 
action is a response to a future threat, such as global warming). Marx’s line of explanation underlines 
the collective nature of social life and the unavoidable growth of alternative modes of production–
consumption as the material condition for any social change challenging the status quo. 
2.4 Boundaries of collective action  
Drawing the boundaries of collective action is probably one of the most complicated endeavour 
scholars have to face. Indeed, we are never alone in carrying out a course of action. Action is always 
collective, engendering varying sets of agents. Thus, tracing boundaries between actions that are 
collective and those that are not, is an indebted operation. However, we have to disentangle the 
different agencies constituting what is often put under the semantic umbrella of ‘collective action’ by 
grasping different phenomena and behaviours. For example, the behaviour of an institution, of a 
corporate actor, such as an enterprise, or the behaviour of a group of individuals that collectively take 
decisions. 
Trying to avoid this confusion, someone refers to the decision makers not as ‘collective’ agents but as 
‘individual’ agents. For Elster, for instance, even when in fact they are corporate actors, they are 
individual in the sense of having one decision to make. The firm sets one price for its product and not 
as many prices as the number of people employed in it (Elster, 1985). Others, such as James Coleman, 
contend this vision. For Coleman, social theory has too often taken the easy path of creating, 
conceptually, exactly the kind of creature at the micro level that, by simple aggregation, will produce 
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the observed systemic behaviour—whether that systemic behaviour is the orderly and mundane 
functioning of a bureaucracy or the spontaneous and emotional outbursts of a crowd (Coleman, 
1994). Since the systemic behaviour being studied seems to exhibit certain properties, the simplest 
social theory to account for that behaviour is the one that generates the system as merely an 
aggregate of persons having the same properties. 
The distinction here is between agents that behave individually and whose aggregate is per se a 
collective action and those that by acting together manifest a so called systemic emergent property 
of collective action. For what refers to COMETS, our interest is more on the dynamic of the sometime 
disordered and tumultuous collective action that leads toward sudden and unpredictable changes 
and innovation than on an institutional and bureaucratic embodiment of these actions. In other 
words, this distinction can be useful for our purpose in that we can bound our collective agents as 
those grassroots movements or communities or cooperatives that take decisions all together, 
privileging an horizontal and bottom-up procedure of decision making rather than a top-down model 
as in the case of corporate actors. For example, Welch and Yates (2018) underline three ideal types 
of collective critical for sustainable transitions: one is the bureaucratic organisation, very familiar to 
standard models of change; the others are groupings and latent networks that are largely overlooked. 
For Welch and Yates, bureaucratic organisations are the socially legitimated institutional form of 
collective that most closely resembles the model of the ‘agentic actor’ (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000), 
meaning that their contribution towards change is familiar and usually overplayed. Bureaucratic 
organisations develop relatively explicit agendas or goals, strategies through which they will be 
pursued, and they integrate around these strategies through complex internal divisions of labour. 
For the authors, classical models of collective action are inadequate to account for the transition to 
sustainability, even though they recognize that ‘collectives’ are the major agents of this transition. In 
our view, institutionalised bodies can be seen as agents of energy transition, but they have to be 
distinguished from other very different agentic collectives. 
2.5 Forms and bodies of collective action 
Communities, cooperatives, collectives, groups, but also clans, tribes, villages, neighbourhoods, all 
show forms of collective action. Community is, however, the more used word to allude to new forms 
of self-organization in the energy field. Community has been and still is an enduring preoccupation 
in social sciences. Community – which we can provisionally define as a social collective bound by a 
common identity, values, and norms – was already implicated into the early analysis of social change, 
modernization, urbanization, industrialization and so on (e.g. in the works of Tönnies, Durkheim, 
Weber, Park, Wirth, Boas). Since then, community has been the common core underlying concepts 
such as identity, cooperation, organization, networks, culture, social capital, urbanity, care, health, 
neighbourhoods. Recently, we can notice a reoccurrence of the term indicating many phenomena 
often very different among them and even contrasting. As noted by Zygmunt Bauman (2001 and 
2017) words have meanings: some words, however, also have a ‘feel’. The word ‘community’ is one 
of them. It feels good: whatever the word ‘community’ may mean, it is good “to have a community”, 
“to be in a community. In a community, Bauman goes on, we all understand each other well, we may 
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trust what we hear, we are safe most of the time and hardly ever puzzled or taken aback. We are 
never strangers to each other. We may quarrel - but these are friendly quarrels, it is just that we are 
all trying to make our togetherness even better and more enjoyable than it has been so far. While 
guided by the same wish to improve our life together, we may disagree how to do it best. In short, 
there is a lot of rhetoric around this word, and this has to make us alert in using too easily and without 
accuracy the term itself.  
There have been many attempts to define the concept of community. These have taken two distinct 
directions: the ‘organic’ conception and the ‘ecological’ conception. Scholars such as Ferdinand 
Tönnies and Max Weber delivered this organic conception, placing emphasis primarily on 
belongingness, close personal contacts and identity of interests as the chief characters of community. 
Scholars such as Robert Park, Robert MacIver, Emory Bogardus, and Louis Wirth shared an 
ecological, spatial, and geographical conception of community. For them, community is a collective 
whose members share a common territorial base for daily activities. Soon, however, these two 
conceptions conflated, thus making that the term ‘community’ came to indicate meanings that are 
more complex. Thus, ‘community’ is employed to describe a fixed locality (a given geographic area) 
as a basis of social organisation. From this point of view, a traditional rural village is a community 
where people are born, live and die. Community is used to refer to a local social system or set of 
relationships that centre upon a given locality. From a sociological point of view, it is the 
concentration of relationships, rather than the geographical factor that matters. The term 
‘community’ is also used to describe a quality of relationship which produces a strong sense of shared 
identity. This usage does not give any importance to the spatial or geographical aspect of the 
community. It does not depend on physical whereabouts or even on people having met each other. 
Applied to energy communities, these distinctions seem still valid. For instance (see Bauwens, 2017), 
it is common to speak of ‘community of interest’ in a Weberian and utilitarian way, or of ‘community 
of place’ whereas the reference is clearly to an ecological and spatial vision provided years ago by 
Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1921). 
2.6 The components of collective action 
The most persistent problem in analysing collective action is its lack of sharp edges: people vary from 
continuous intensive involvement to passive compliance, and interests vary from quite 
individualistic to nearly universal. To investigate collective action we embrace a mobilization model 
that we believe it is the most appropriated to understand dynamics of collective action that are not 
related to social uprisings, riots, revolutions and so on, but to more ‘inconspicuous’ attempts to 
escape the incumbent hegemony of energy providers while simultaneously coping with global 
environmental risks such as climate change. Four important components or variable characteristics 
of contenders in the energy market are interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and 
collective action itself.  
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Figure 1 - The mobilization model (source: Tilly, 1978) 
2.6.1 Interests 
Interests are the gains and losses resulting from a group's interaction with other groups. We will deal 
with what constitutes a relevant group, and how to identify or measure real and durable interests. 
The shared advantages or disadvantages of a collective likely accrue because of various possible 
interactions with other collectives. Most analyses of collective action mobilization take the groups 
involved, as well as their interests, for granted. Once we notice who is acting, it rarely seems difficult 
to explain why they, and not other collectives, are acting. Nonetheless, many groups fail to mobilize, 
some mobilized groups fail to act collectively, some collective actors fail to reach their goals, and 
many actors come and go. A valid theory of collective action must explain the comings and goings. 
Part of the explanation surely resides in the fact that individuals have varying interests in collective 
action. Theories in the tradition of utilitarianism give us little guidance in the identification of a 
group's interest. Yet they suggest that the nature of the collective's central decision-making 
structures - its market, its system of access - strongly affects which people have an interest in acting 
together. Durkheimian theories tell us to watch the creation and destruction of collectives through 
the changing social differentiations and related classes and roles dynamics. They tell us to expect 
greater action (or at least a different kind of action) from the collectives being most completely and 
rapidly transformed, for example nucleus of middle class that fell to be victims of injustice or of a 
process of downward. In this perspective, individual and collective interests generally conflict in the 
short run. Moreover, individual reactions and impulses – for instance the disappointment they 
experience as consumers or as citizens – can easily transform into more rational interests, this 
depending on the capacity of society to channel their resentments. Weberian theories also draw our 
attention to social changes, providing an anticipation about activity of groups, which have attached 
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themselves to new systems of belief. Shared belief itself leads to a definition of interest, and 
stimulates action oriented to that interest. 
The interest, as a lens to forecast collective action presents other dilemmas. The first is about the 
relationship between interest and organization. A major effort in literature concerned the proper 
way to identify the interest of a collective. To try to solve it, there are two alternative strategies: 1) 
infer the interest from the collective' s own statements and actions; 2) infer it from a general analysis 
of the connections between interest and social position. Utilitarian theorists tend to do some version 
of the first: they try to ground their analyses on utilities or preferences revealed directly or indirectly 
by the actors. Social structuralists often do some version of the second: they determine a group's 
interest by analysing its relationship to the socio-economic structure.  
The first choice - inferring the interest from the collective’ claims and actions - is open to serious 
objections. Many groups appear to be unaware of their own real reasons to act together. Either they 
have not articulated their shared interests, or they have done it falsely. At the same time, the 
appropriate evidence is very hard to identify and assemble. People often say conflicting things or 
nothing at all. But the second one - inferring interests from a general analysis of the connections 
between interests and social position – also has serious drawbacks. It aims to override a group’s own 
vision of its interests. General interest schemes commonly reveal a conflict between short-run and 
long-run interests that can leads to ambivalent and often unsuccessful strategies. In short, which is 
the ‘real’ interest? Answering this question could result crucial if we assume that people behave as 
they do because the goals they fashioned for themselves appear to influence their behavior even 
when those goals are trivial, vague, unrealistic or self-defeating. To respond to the dilemma we can 
treat the regime of production, distribution and consumption of common goods (such as energy) as 
predictors of the interests people will pursue in the long or in the short run.  
The second, and perhaps more important dilemma, concerns the potential conflict between 
individuals and group interests. Often conflicts lead to fractures inside the collective and these 
fractures among members may be the cause of the vanishing of collective action. Conflicts can cross 
all the range of interests that enter the collective action process. The way in which these tensions can 
be hold under control depends on the organization. 
We can go beyond the concept of ‘interest’ by embracing the term ‘motivation’, which sounds less 
utilitarian. There are always forces mobilizing, driving, and energizing individuals to act, interact, 
and organize, but there is not a consensus about the nature of these forces, or teleological structures. 
However, we suggest that collective action applied to the energy field is mobilized by expectations 
regarding collective and self-interest that some time can be harmonized, some other time can enter 
in conflict. For instance, individual utility (e.g. money), needs satisfaction, deprivation avoidance, and 
personal security can struggle with the including, cooperating and trusting others, social esteem and 
approval, the use of deliberative capacities for the definition of lines of conduct, collective and 
commons property or use, opportunity to distribute energy surplus to vulnerable people. This long 
list of plausible motivations to act together pertains to two different ontological schemes, one 
individual and the other one collective. However, acknowledging the cruciality of this dilemma for 
21 
collective action, the potential conflicts temper because people are always inserted in different 
systems of action that mainly takes a daily-life configuration and it is impossible for people to go out 
of these systems of practices and thus to avoid the conciliation with the others. The constraint 
exercised by these systems of practices is undoubtable, but there is often the possibility to change if 
people acknowledge collective action as a powerful leverage of innovation. 
2.6.2 Organisation 
The organization is that aspect of a group's structure which most directly affects its capacity to act 
on its interests. Clearly, one of the problems is to determine which features of organization do make 
a difference. Is it possible, for example, that how much are members committed makes little 
difference to the form and intensity of their collective action? Is it possible that the neatness of an 
organization's division of labor matters greatly? Organization corresponds to the extent of common 
action and unifying structure among the individuals in the population. Organization is not static; it is 
but a process, an increase in common action and/or unifying structure (disorganization happens 
when there is a decline in common action and/or unifying structure). 
We find two main elements in the organizational analysis. 1) Categories of people who share some 
characteristics (e.g. there are all females, all residents of the neighbourhood). A full-fledged category 
contains people all of whom recognize their common characteristic, and whom everyone else 
recognizes as having that characteristic. 2) There are also networks of people who are linked to each 
other, directly or indirectly, by a specific kind of interpersonal bond: a chain of people each of whom 
owes someone else. If the common characteristic of the interpersonal bond is ordinary, then the 
categories and networks defined by them tend to be large. 
However, networks have in their disclosing only a descriptive function. Networks only indicate the 
extent of people included in the collective action, maybe their closeness, but not their deep 
motivation for doing that or, again, the reason of their mobilization and the way in which a variety of 
actors are enrolled in the action itself. Most often in social sciences, ‘social’ designates a type of link 
taken as a specific domain. However, in the perspective we are here suggesting, our look moves 
toward a complex of social, material, economical, and moral principles and connections that go far 
beyond the investigation of social networks.  
Our notion of organization stresses the group inclusiveness: how does it come to absorb members' 
whole lives. For ‘inclusiveness’ we can choose among three related indicators: the amount of time 
spent in collective action, the amount of energy devoted to collective action, the proportion of all 
social interactions in which the members and other people are taking into account the fact of group 
membership. Other features of a group's structure one might want to consider in judging how 
‘organized’ it is are its efficiency and its effectiveness - or the structural features presumably affecting 
efficiency and effectiveness, such as differentiation, centrality and stratification. We stress 
inclusiveness on two grounds: (1) the hypothesis that it is the main aspect of group structure 
affecting the ability to mobilize; (2) the intrinsic difficulty of separating effectiveness and efficiency 
from the mobilization and collective action. By the standard of inclusiveness, an isolated community 
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will tend to be highly organized, but so will some occupational groups, some religious groups, and 
some political groups.  
We need these indicators in order to highlight about the individuals and groups that could, in 
principle, mobilize. We also need them to specify what it means to say that organization promotes 
mobilization. The number of potential mobilizers is enormous as well as the number of ‘challenging 
groups’. Instead of attempting to prepare an unbiased list of all potential mobilizers, we can take one 
or two dimensions of differentiation which are of theoretical interest, search for evidence of group 
formation, and then of mobilization, at different locations along the dimension, letting the 
differentials test more general assertions concerning the determinants of organization and 
mobilization. In analyses of energy alternatives to the market, we can take the entire population of 
CAIs, divide it into categories and types of energy production, then document variation in the 
organization (cooperatives, purchasing groups, municipal-driven communities, and so on), type and 
intensity of cooperation, and propensity to challenge incumbents. Different ways of dividing the 
population of CAIs will produce different results, helping us to decide which differentials are durable 
and general. However, to explain group differentials as determinants and core variables of collective 
action, we have to take into account all our components: interests, organization, mobilization, and 
opportunity. Interests and organization alone are not enough to explain the course of collective 
action. The reasoning about isolated masses and toughness gives a particular but inadequate account 
of the organizational structure and individuals’ interests characteristic of different countries and 
regions. But it says nothing about differentials in mobilization or opportunity to cooperate. 
Mobilization and opportunities improve the picture of the collective action. 
2.6.3 Mobilisation and resources’ control 
Mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed 
for action. Resources may be labour power, goods, weapons, votes and many other things, insofar as 
they are usable in acting on shared interests. Sometimes a group such as a community has a complex 
internal structure, but few pooled resources. Sometimes it is high in resources, but the resources are 
all under the control of individuals. The analysis of mobilization deals with the ways in which groups 
acquire resources and make them available for collective action. Mobilization regards the extent of 
resources that go under the collective control of the contender as a process, an increase in the 
resources or in the degree of collective control (we can call a decline in either one demobilization) 
can get important consequences for the outcomes of collective action itself. 
Amitai Etzioni (1968: 388-389) defines mobilization as “the process by which a unit gains 
significantly in the control of assets it previously did not control... A mere increase in the assets of 
members, of subunits, or even of the unit itself does not mean that mobilization has occurred, though 
it increases the mobilization potential. The change in the capacity to control and to use assets is what 
is significant”. Etzioni offers a rough classification of assets, or resources: technical (e.g., energy 
plants, local grid); utilitarian (e.g., energy services, money); normative (e.g., loyalties, obligations, 
trust). A group mobilizes if it gains greater collective control over technical, utilitarian, and normative 
resources, demobilizes if it loses that sort of control. Etzioni's classification of resources, that we bent 
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over our scope, is helpful and interesting. In our case, we focus on a set of resources that vary from 
factor of production nominally under collective control to an outcome that can be thought as a 
collective good, the energy itself used in different places by different members. 
Loyalty refers to the breadth of members' commitments to deliver resources. It has three dimensions: 
• the amount of resources committed; 
• the range of resources involved; 
• the range of circumstances in which the resources will be delivered. 
Albert Hirschman (1970) considers loyalty as one of the major alternative modes of demand for an 
organization's services. In the context of response to decline in the performance of organizations, he 
distinguished three possible reactions of consumers, clients, or members of a given organization: exit, 
voice, and loyalty. Economics, Hirschman comments, treats exit - a cessation of demand for the 
commodity or service - as the normal response to declining quality. In the ease of schools, 
governments, and other organizations whose performances fluctuate, he argues, two other responses 
are common. The relevant public may voice its dissatisfaction, with implicit or explicit threats of exit. 
Or it may tolerate unsatisfactory performance for a while because the costs of exit or voice are greater 
than the loss of quality. That tolerance is a measure of subjective returns from the organization, hence 
of loyalty. Here loyalty can be turned from the former organization that provides energy to the new 
one that substitutes it. The changing direction of loyalty, the withdrawal of the loyalty from one 
organization to another one less bureaucratic, centralized, and authoritative, is the challenge of the 
emerging collective actions in the energy field. Here trust plays a role providing the basis for loyalty: 
loyal people are those that trust the collective to which they belong. 
The major variables affecting the probability of delivery are therefore: the extent of competing claims 
on the resources involved; the nature of the action to which the resources are to be committed; and 
how organized the mobilizing group is. If the resources are free of competing claims, if the action 
clearly defends the interests of every member, and if the group is an all-embracing moral community, 
then the probability of delivery is close to 100 percent. Loyalty then is at its maximum and the 
probability of departure or contestation - exit or voice - is at its minimum. Indeed, a significant part 
of the work of mobilization goes into changing these three variables: reducing the competing claims 
on resources controlled by members; developing a program which corresponds to the perceived 
interests of members; building up a group structure which minimizes exit and voice. 
Mobilization is also the outcome of some unusual situations. Usually people, individuals and groups 
that initiate a process of change, merely act in the way on which elements of a system of practice link 
together. Practices are in this perspective bundles of different elements that change: these bundles 
put together goals or teleological systems, knowledge, rules, physical environments populated of 
artefacts and natural resources, discourses on all that.  
Collective action dynamics show often a changing mix of the priorities assigned to exit, voice, and 
loyalty. The professionals concentrate on accumulating resources free of competing claims, the 
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rationalists on adapting their program to current group interests, the moralists on building an 
inclusive group. 
Thus, any group's mobilization program breaks down into these components: 
1. Accumulating resources; 
2. Increasing collective claims on the resources: 
a) by reducing competing claims; 
b) by altering the program of collective action; 
c) by changing the satisfaction due to participation in the group as such. 
Collectives do their mobilizing in a number of different ways. We can make crude distinctions among 
defensive, alternative, and preparatory mobilization (Tilly, 1978). In defensive mobilization, a threat 
from outside induces the members of a group to pool their resources to avoid bad consequences for 
its members. This is case of people that cooperate to avoid not genuine food, increasing prices, the 
superpower of corporate actors. Alternative mobilization is often top-down. In this case a group 
pools resources in response to opportunities to realize its interests in a way which is alternative to 
the existing ones. A common form of offensive mobilization consists of the diffusion of a new 
alternative organizational strategy. Preparatory mobilization is with no doubt the most top-down of 
all. In this perspective, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats. 
The early experiences of cooperatives go in this direction. They built up a store of money to cushion 
hardship – future unemployment, the loss of wages, and the shortage of some fundamental good such 
as energy. It also puts together knowledge and organizational skills, for example in the case of energy 
cooperatives, which take care of all aspect of energy cycle. In a general view, cooperatives can greatly 
increase the capacity of their members to act together: to make collective demands, to find solution 
to commons problems, to develop alternatives for the future. Often alternative and preparatory 
strategies are indistinguishable. The basic distinction is between defensive and alternative 
mobilization that implies also different future horizons, one conservative the other alternative. In 
few words, common sense says that the riches mobilize conservatively, in defence of their threatened 
interests while the poor mobilize radically, in search of what they lack. However, the riches are 
constantly mobilizing to take advantage of new opportunities to maximize their interests. The poor 
can rarely afford to. 
Lastly, for implementing (and investigating) mobilization and (widely speaking) innovative social 
processes, may play a crucial role the profile of the actors that initiate a process of change or 
innovation. Particularly relevant seen to be those that can be recognized as ‘catalytic innovators’ 
(Moulaert et al., 2017) since they are defined by five distinct qualities. First, they create social change 
through scaling and replication. Second, they meet a need that is either over served (that is, the 
existing solution is more complex than necessary for many people) or not served at all. Third, the 
products and services they offer are simpler and cheaper than alternatives, but recipients view them 
as good enough. Fourth, they bring in resources in ways that initially seem unattractive to 
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incumbents. And fifth, they are often ignored, put down, or even discouraged by existing 
organisations, which do not see the catalytic innovators’ solutions as viable (Moulaert et al., 2017). 
The approach based on catalytic innovators is interesting, insofar as it also opens a window on social 
innovation. However, it seems to us it suffers of some limitations. First of all, it is an approach that 
privileges a top-down vision, where leaders or innovators induce the process of mobilization. Second, 
it is very close to the Weberian individual ‘charisma’ where the rational blends with the irrational 
(the magic capabilities of the charismatic leader). Third, its capacity to attract interests and resources 
is often overestimated.  
2.6.3.1 From mobilization to collective action 
Collective action is joint action in pursuit of common ends. Up to this point, we have argued that the 
extent of a group' s collective action is a function of: (1) the extent of its shared interests (advantages 
and disadvantages likely to result from interactions with other groups); (2) the intensity of its 
organization (the extent of common identity and unifying structure among its members); and (3) its 
mobilization (the amount of resources under its collective control). Soon we will add the 
opportunity/threat structure as crucial determinant of a group's collective action.  
Collective actors attempt to produce collective goods that have a specific value in relation to their 
interests and are expending valuable resources in the effort. If we can imagine assigning relative 
values to the collective goods produced and the resources expended, we can think of a contender as 
gaining, losing, or breaking even. Diagrammatically, we have Fig. 2. In the shaded area above the 
diagonal, the value of the collective goods obtained is greater than the value of the resources 
expended; that is a gain (Tilly, 1978). Below the diagonal, we have losses, and the diagonal itself is a 
break-even line. 
 
Figure 2 - Gains and losses in collective action (source: Tilly, 1978) 
In any collective action, there are real limits on how much to gain or to lose, the two main limits being 
mobilization and opportunity. The group cannot expend more resources than it has currently 
mobilized: that sets an unbreakable limit in one direction. The opportunities for gain are finite: that 
sets a limit in the other direction. Both mobilization and opportunity limit the possible gains from 
collective action. It clearly follows that a change in mobilization or opportunity will produce a change 
in the set of gains and losses available to a group. Zero mobilization equals zero gains. 
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2.6.4 Opportunities/Threats 
It concerns the relationship between a collective and the current state of the world around it. Changes 
in these relationships sometimes threaten the group's interests or alternatively provide new chances 
to act on those interests. The problem with studying opportunity is that it is hard to reconstruct 
which opportunities are realistically available to the group at the time. We can minimize that 
disadvantage by looking only at contemporary collective action or by concentrating on situations in 
which the opportunities are rigorously defined and strictly limited. Then we lose our ability to follow 
large-scale changes, in their real complexity, over considerable periods of time. In this first rough 
statement of the model, opportunity has three elements: 
Power: the extent to which the outcomes of the collective's interactions with others favours interests 
over those of the others; acquisition of power is an increase in the favourability of such outcomes; 
loss of power is a decline in their favourability. This perspective is useful in that CAIs often establish 
relationships with several other actors such as experts, bankers, funders, politicians, institutions, 
governments. All these relationships can strength or weak the collective action potential. 
Costs: we refer here to the costs of the contender’s collective action resulting from interaction with 
other actors or entities. Viewed as a process, there are actions by another agent which raise the 
contender's cost of collective action as well as there are actions which lower the contender’s costs. In 
the latter case, we can speak of facilitation’s forms. 
Opportunity/threat: this pair indicates the extent to which other collective agents, including 
corporate actors such as institutions or corporations, are either: (a) vulnerable to new claims which 
would, if successful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests; or (b) threatening to make 
claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender's realization of its interests. 
Apparatus or device: here we refer to an assemblage of technical and social elements that, in a given 
moment, has the strategic function to respond to an urgency or to plan strategies of reproduction of 
the system itself. In the case of energy, it indicates fundamental changes in the different operations 
of the energy regime.  
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3 Collective action for the energy transition 
3.1 Energy as a common and the potential of collective action in the energy field 
In the previous section, we explored the collective action perspective as an important frame to 
explain the dynamics of social systems. Moreover, we introduced the idea that the main outcome of 
collective action is the generation of different collective or common goods (we use here the adjectives 
‘collective’ and ‘common’ in an interchangeable way until further notice). Networks of social 
cooperation often develop into systematic patterns of collective action in neighbourhood 
associations, cooperatives, social centres, networks and social movements. These collective-based 
forms of social cooperation have the potential to give rise to different common goods developing 
cultures of horizontality, commons ecologies, and new organizational forms. In this section, we shine 
light on the current debate on different forms of collective action generating new energy commons. 
Rather than participating as mere and passive energy consumers, members of a collective can assume 
several different roles within the energy system. Civil society engagement in the energy market can 
take several forms (ILO, 2013; DECC, 2014) and the concept of collective action in the energy 
transition is subject to different interpretations within the academic literature. Some define them as 
any sustainable energy initiative led by no profit organizations, not commercially driven or 
government led (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008, Hall et al., 2016). Some others stress the 
grassroots innovation nature of community energy, as driven by civil society activists and by social 
and/or environmental needs, rather than rent seeking (Seyfang et al., 2014). For all, they get the 
potential and can often influence the ways and the extent to which energy is produced, distributed, 
consumed, and dissipated. 
The considerable degradation or loss of many natural resources, including fisheries, lakes, and 
forests, as well as the major reductions in biodiversity and the accelerating climate change, pose the 
problem of the reasons of such dynamics. Many of these resources have been managed for centuries 
as commons. Rivers, forests, ecosystem services, and geo-system services such as raw materials and 
renewable and non-renewable energy, have been ruled in a collective way just to preserve their 
fertility. The changes toward strong private property regimes of management accelerates their 
degradation and losses. Energy is by definition a common: directly or indirectly it comes from the 
Sun, and no one owns the Sun.  
Commons imply collective action. No common can be managed individually, be it a natural or a 
corporate person. A common is defined in the field of energy as a resource which is owned and 
managed by a community, with a system of rules for production and consumption of the resource. 
For Bollier (2014, 15), a common is “a resource + a community + a set of social protocols”. A common 
is characterised by situations where there is a social dilemma, or a need for collective action – which 
Darnton describes as a “‘tyranny of small decisions’ whereby the outcome of millions of individual 
decisions is in conflict with what people collectively want” (Darnton, 2008, 6). Scholars including 
Rose (1986), Künneke and Finger (2009) and Frischmann (2012) argue that infrastructures should 
be considered as commons, due to the positive social and economic externalities of universal access 
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to energy, the negative climate externalities of associated greenhouse gas emissions, and the natural 
monopoly tendencies of energy infrastructure. 
A common is also characterised by consumption and production activities being carried out by the 
same groups of individuals. This was the case in historic agricultural and peasant communities, and 
it is now being rediscovered in a modern context with the concept of ‘prosumption’ (Ritzer, 2010). 
This term is widely used in the context of smart grids, both with reference to individuals (Mitchell, 
2014; Skjølsvold et al., 2015) practicing ‘self-consumption’, and with reference to community 
production and consumption (Karnouskos, 2011; Hertig and Teufel, 2016; Moreno-Munoz et al., 
2016). At the same time, the growth of the community energy sector (Seyfang et al., 2013; DECC, 
2014; Blanchet, 2015; Bauwens et al., 2016), and the movement for energy democracy (Sweeney, 
2012; Platform, 2014; Angel, 2016), shows an appetite for collective, local participation in the 
development of the future energy system and greater participation in energy system governance. 
A vast and growing volume of practical action for sustainability converges on a common principle of 
creating and defending commons as an effective and democratic form of action that overcomes the 
limits of both state and market: that of the state to effectively legislate and to enforce that legislation 
without recourse to authoritarianism, and that of markets to build in criteria for sustainability that 
contradict their fundamental premise (Bollier and Helfrich, 2012). With respect to energy, shifts 
towards community ownership and remunicipalisation of services represent an alternative pathway 
towards decarbonisation of generation combined with changing patterns of provision and usage 
necessary to reconcile sustainability and justice (Blanchet, 2019). We can therefore define collective 
action initiatives as those that seek to create new commons based on linked principles of 
sustainability and social justice as complements or alternatives to the actions of state and for-profit 
business. 
Detailed case study research on community-based initiatives from several European countries 
revealed them to enable significant reductions in carbon footprint in all four domains of activity 
considered (energy, food, waste and transportation): most markedly through provision of renewable 
electricity and heat, generating reductions of up to nearly 85% on baseline levels of associated 
(domain-specific) emissions and reductions of up to a quarter in beneficiaries’ overall carbon 
footprints (Landholm et al., 2016). 
Extrapolating from the realised emissions reductions of case study initiatives, the TESS research 
project estimated potential overall reductions of 73% or more across Europe in the (considered 
unlikely) scenario that every EU citizen was involved in a community-based initiative (Celata and 
Hendrickson, 2016). Modelling of two potential low carbon transition pathways for Europe, one 
driven by technological substitution, the other by upscaling to regime level of relevant niche 
innovations, indicated the latter to produce deeper and longer-lasting reductions in carbon emissions 
(Hof et al., 2016). In terms of historical examples, Denmark’s emergence from the 1970s on as a 
pioneer both in installation of renewable energy and (for a time) global leader in manufacture of 
wind turbines was the result of basing rollout of wind power in a pre-existing culture of cooperative 
ownership of infrastructure (van Est, 1999). The Austrian solar thermal industry grew to a leading 
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position in global manufacturing from origins as a self-organised popular education movement 
among an initially small number of self-construction enthusiasts in rural parts of the country 
(Ornetzeder, 2001; Ornetzeder and Rohracher, 2006). In Germany, EWS-Schönau developed from a 
local community initiative to a regional network operator and nationwide renewable energy supplier 
despite strong opposition from the incumbent operator by leveraging popular support for its political 
vision of a more democratic and decentralised energy system, leading it to become a significant 
national player without compromising its core values (Sladek, 2014).The concept of Collective Action 
Initiatives deployed in COMETS integrates various precedents in the literature. These include 
Sustainability Transitions, Social Innovation, and Community-based initiatives. Each of these, in 
common with CAIs, is relevant to numerous domains of action and has specific expressions in the 
field of energy. 
The interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research field of Sustainability Transitions arose in the 
late 1990s in response to the need to anticipate, deliberately initiate and manage the socio-technical 
transitions necessary to bring about sustainable development (see Loorbach et al. 2017 for a recent 
review). Among its key concepts are regimes and niches. A regime is the predominant socio-technical 
configuration in any domain, such as energy. Niches are sites of innovation in some way isolated from 
coercive pressures exerted by the incumbent regime, hence able to explore alternative socio-
technical configurations and reveal challenge power relations that hinder transitions to 
sustainability (Avelino, 2017). Although sometimes initiated within incumbent regimes as controlled 
sites of experimentation, niches increasingly arise as what are termed ‘grassroots innovations’: 
autonomous initiatives self-consciously transgressive (to varying extents) of predominant values 
and approaches and adopting sustainability as a core ethos rather than correction or secondary 
concern (Seyfang and Smith, 2007). Community energy has been identified as one such grassroots 
innovation niche (Seyfang et al., 2014). 
Integrating insights from sustainability transitions and social innovation theory, the concept of 
Transformative Social Innovation (TSI) refers to a form of social innovation that “challenges, alters 
and/or replaces established (and/or dominant) institutions in (parts of) the social-material context” 
(Haxeltine et al., 2016, 19). TSI initiatives, therefore, not only act as innovation niches, they explicitly 
seek to change their wider context by stimulating institutional change, though this raises risks of 
appropriation or marginalisation (Bauler et al., 2017). One example is sustainable energy initiatives 
in the INFORSE network, whose work has contributing to narratives in favour of renewable energy 
moving from the margins of public opinion in the 1970s to the mainstream, with almost universal 
support for a goal of 100% renewable energy in countries such as Denmark and Belgium (Elle, 2015). 
Overlapping with both grassroots innovation and TSI is that of community-led initiatives (or 
community-led initiatives): action towards defined environmental and/or social goals on the part of 
self-organised communities, whether associated with a geographical locality (as a community of 
place) or common interest (community of practice) (Penha-Lopes and Henfrey, 2019). 
All these forms of collective action initiatives transcend, in both potential and practice, purely 
piecemeal, marginal and small-scale action. Sustainability Transitions refers to the ‘empowered 
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niche’ (or niche-regime), which emerges when niches gain enough power to challenge, or even 
replace, the dominant regime (Haxeltine et al., 2008). However, empowerment is no simple concept: 
TSI takes place within complex and fast-changing dynamics of power relations across shifting 
boundaries, in which windows of opportunity for systemic change might arise unexpectedly and 
vanish rapidly (Avelino, 2017). A significant dimension of this empowerment derives from 
participation in translocal networks that integrate connections of mutual support, social learning and 
collective action from local up to transnational levels (Avelino et al., 2019). Rootedness in common 
narratives and shared values shared and deepened through participation in translocal networks 
empowers community-led initiatives to mount consistent and effective challenges to dominant 
regimes and associated cultural discourses (Henfrey and Ford, 2018). On this basis, social, cultural 
and technological innovation originating in localised initiatives can translate into transformative 
change at higher levels of scale (Henfrey et al., 2017). 
3.2 CAIs in the energy field as a driver of social innovation  
The growing amount of research and investigations devoted to the social aspects of the energy 
transition focuses on both processes and outcomes (energy as a good). Some of them concentrate on 
population attitudes and values regarding the transition towards renewables, whereas others focus 
on more structured ways to enhance the energy transition, for example upon the so-called energy 
communities. As we are going to see, under the term ‘community’ there are a lot of different collective 
action configurations, from cooperatives to purchasing groups, from neighbourhood energy 
communities to virtual communities exchanging energy in a virtual market. All these studies have 
extended merits for casting new lights about the social limits and potentialities of the energy 
transition, and yet they lack something. 
Theoretical perspectives on the market acceptability of renewables and on the social acceptability of 
the energy transition are understood on the view of three main visions: 
1) those looking at national styles of regulation: these perspectives open up scenarios usually 
regarding the regulation of energy market and its diversification coming from the addition of 
renewables to conventional fossil sources. However, these studies remain in the side of market 
providers that are seen as the principal actor of these innovative changes. Sometimes the analysis 
extends on the characteristics of the political systems as well as on its capabilities to impose or drive 
these changes, or conversely to be manipulated by fossil energy lobbies. The social, in the sense of 
consumers and users, remains in the background, often conceptualized as ‘public opinion’; 
2) those analysing the barriers to renewable energy: analysis of barriers to the spread of renewables 
is also a common and conventional way to look at the topic. Here the focus is not on the capabilities 
of proponents to propel solid changes towards renewables, but the individuation of obstacles and the 
ways to overcome them. Obviously, this is a worthy effort, but it is rarely approached as collective 
action or the way to overcome obstacles in a collective effort. Barriers are often seen as dependent 
by markets and institutions, such as subsidies for conventional forms of energy, high initial capital 
costs, imperfect capital markets, lack of skills or information, financing risks and uncertainties, high 
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transaction costs, and a variety of regulatory and institutional factors (Painuly, 2001; Beck and 
Martinot, 2004; Chakraborty et al., 2016). Social barriers are rarely investigated, or they are seen as 
problems of information, communication, rejection of technology, and so on; 
3) those looking at the factors that drive local acceptance and opposition to renewable energy 
(Sovacool and Pushkala, 2012): a third area of scholarship can be found in those studies looking at 
the local acceptance (or opposition) to renewable energy projects and that mainly focuses on social 
aspects. Here the opposition is especially against wind farms or solar farms. The approach of 
acceptance/rejection of these technologies is faceted, however it can be said that the prevalent prism 
for understanding, or the watermark of, such investigations is the idea that people oppose these 
plants because not well educated or informed. On the contrary, they accept renewable plants when 
informed or when sharing positive values and attitudes towards renewables. From the point of view 
of attitudes and values investigation, as we know it, these studies approach agents as individual 
objects of energy policies deliberated by different corporate actors, being them governments or 
incumbent providers. This is the reason why these studies often focus on social acceptance, which 
means the availability of people taken on their generality to embrace new ways to produce and, less, 
to consume energy (see for example, D’Agostino et al., 2011; Sovacool and Blyth, 2015). As it is self-
evident, social acceptability - which depends on values, attitudes, and interests (mainly about the 
lowering of energy price for consumers) - implies a passive role of agents, whereas the ‘action’ to be 
performed is only the fact to change provider – from fossil energy to renewable energy provision. 
The outputs of relevance of/for social dimension (innovation) have been categorized under the 
headings of: 
a) Local jobs and wealth creation; 
b) Reduced (energy) poverty; 
c) Fairness and democratic systems; 
d) Empowerment and social values; 
e) Increased social acceptance2 of renewables; 
f) Increased energy security as neither import nor transport is required; 
g) Education, higher awareness of sustainable practices; 
h) Challenging the status-quo and existing socio-technical regimes; 
i) Informal networks and social movements; 
j) Gender. 
 
a) Local jobs and local wealth creation  
The potential capability of the CAIs for the energy transition to create local jobs is sometimes 
mentioned in existing literature (e.g. Koirala et al., 2016). This capability should basically derive from 
the fact that the energy transition is generally associated with a shift from centralized energy 
 
2 The authors find the term ‘social acceptance’ problematic in that it may imply a simplistic problem-solution whereby 
solutions made by policymakers etc. need to be 'accepted' by communities. Nevertheless, we have kept it in because it is 
referred to in the literature in this way. 
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infrastructures to decentralized ones and with reduced need for energy imports. Decentralized 
energy infrastructures are indeed supposed to require more use of local energy and material 
resources and wider engagement of local communities. Evidences of these effects are nevertheless 
lacking (Kunze and Becker, 2014, 51). On the one hand, the sign of the net balance between jobs 
destroyed in non-renewable energy sectors and jobs created because of a transition to decentralized 
renewable energy systems depends on economic considerations concerning, among others, the costs 
of involved technologies and of human and energy resources. Under this point of view, despite the 
fact that renewable energy sources can sometimes be used at zero costs (solar energy is an example 
of these zero cost energy sources), it is not that straightforward that the costs of jobs created in 
renewable energy sectors are lower than costs in non-renewable energy sectors, notably in those 
countries where the diffusion of renewables relies heavily on state subsidies (Green, 2011). On the 
other hand, even in the case of a positive balance, it is not so automatic that jobs created would be 
‘local’ due to the higher knowledge content of renewable energy technologies. CAIs aiming to local 
ownership of energy equipment, sources and distribution systems remain however certainly an 
interesting potential opportunity to generate local wealth in so far as profits deriving from energy 
generation and distribution can in principle be kept by owners and used locally (Creupelandt and 
Vansintjan, 2018). A number of authors have found that local energy communities contribute to local 
economic development (Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2010; Shaw and Mazzucchelli, 2010). 
b) Reduced (energy) poverty  
Energy poverty reduction is an explicit aim of several collective initiatives undertaken by energy 
cooperatives. This objective is generally addressed by developing solidarity schemes (either using 
revenues from renewable energy generation or not) that can contribute to reduce energy bills of 
vulnerable members or by providing them with services or education to reduce energy consumption 
(Friends of the Earth Europe, 2018). The opinion that CAIs undertaken by local energy communities 
can reduce energy poverty is mentioned in several documents of European Institutions (Coulon and 
Krieger, 2018; O’Brien at al., 2018). Despite some indicators are being used to measure it (see 
European Commission, 2015), the question remains whether this concept can be defined and 
measured in a way that captures all its facets. 
c) Fairness and democratic systems 
According to a case study on various energy projects (Hiteva and Sovacool, 2017), elements of energy 
justice were demonstrated through social innovation (defined by the authors as an equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits, affordability, due process and greater participation in decision-
making). Specifically, the grassroots energy community identified: showed an enhancement of access 
to energy services and benefits; created value by providing capacity building, training, and access to 
discounted; materials, services and low cost finance to reduce household energy usage; and 
participation in energy decision making and vision building. Similarly, drawing on a number of case 
study examples, (Bianchi and Ginelli, 2018) describe the importance of social, spatial, structural, 
intergenerational and procedural equity in achieving acceptance of energy projects – and those case 
studies show how energy communities foster this equitable consensus. 
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A number of authors praise energy communities for their 'democratic' characteristics, which are 
often linked to ideas of enhancing democratic influence of citizens on their energy provider (Van der 
Schoor et al., 2016); and having less dependency3 on energy providers with a specific focus on the 
improvement of the wellbeing of disadvantaged actors (Schreuer, 2016). Barr and Devine-Wright 
(2012) found that community energy projects help to promote a more sustainable and resilient 
society while offering communities legitimacy, consensus, and voice.  
According to Seyfang et al. (2013), by enabling and empowering communities to collectively change 
their social, economic and technical contexts to transition to more sustainable lives and practice their 
ideological commitment to sustainability, community energy projects help groups and individuals to 
overcome the structural limitations of individualistic measures by bringing communities together 
with a common purpose. 
d) Empowerment and social values 
Bauwens and Defourny (2017) found that energy communities in Belgium have social capital in 
terms of social identification with the cooperative and generalized interpersonal trust and network 
structure. Based on their research on three case studies (wind technology in Denmark, the solar 
collector do-it-yourself movement in Austria, and the development of car sharing in Switzerland), 
Ornetzeder and Rohracher (2013) make a number of conclusions regarding grassroots one-issue 
communities – including that they share an innovation culture based on democracy, openness, 
diversity, practical experimentation, social learning, and negotiation. Rogers et al. (2012) found that 
energy communities build on local knowledge and networks to find foster locally appropriate 
solutions and community cohesion. 
e) Increased social acceptance of renewables  
Authors discuss the topic of social acceptance in relation to the issue of legitimacy. Ornetzeder and 
Rohracher (2013) found that the grassroots nature of energy communities was important in the early 
phases of development and provided empowerment for the projects which gave them a certain level 
of legitimacy. This was done by linking the projects to broader societal discourses and movements 
including e.g. antinuclear, limits of growth, Hewitt et al. (2019). Similarly, studies have found that 
where benefits are seen in an equitable way in the community, public acceptance is likely to be 
greater (Rogers et al., 2008; Warren and McFadyen, 2010).  
f) Increased energy security as neither import nor transport is required  
CAIs targeting local energy generation and management of energy demand are supposed to increase 
energy security. Integration of different energy technologies and local energy sources and carriers is 
generally seen as the best technical approach to increase security. Integration of co-generation and 
local distribution networks of heat and electricity is an example of how this integration can be 
achieved (Koirala et al., 2016). Overall, increased energy security relies however on a combination of 
 
3 Schreuer (2016) found that these conditions in energy communities are evident, but not always seen at the same time, 
and in fact they may sometimes compromise one another. For example, the provision of additional resources to bottom-up 
initiatives (e.g. feed-in tariffs provided by the state) increases their resource base but also creates a new dependency 
relation. 
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technological renewable energy solutions, business and governance models (see the example of 
renewable energy model regions, in Ooms et al., 2017, 37). As energy balance is achieved at the local 
level in larger areas, national energy systems might however experience negative consequences in 
case peak demand of many areas coincides. To avoid this, smart integration systems operating on a 
large scale become necessary. From a perspective of increasingly integrated energy systems, local 
energy security becomes therefore inevitably interlaced with larger scale security. 
g) Education, higher awareness of sustainable practices 
A number of studies mention the educational benefits of energy communities. Rogers et al. (2012) 
state that they help to create awareness and transparency on energy issues that may be unclear or 
confusing. Seyfang et al. (2013) found that community energy projects help to raise awareness of 
sustainable energy issues, improving public receptivity to renewable energy installations, increasing 
engagement in behaviour-change initiatives and helping to reduce carbon emissions (Millard, 2017). 
h) Challenging the status-quo and existing socio-technical regimes  
CAIs for the energy transition may be promoted not only in terms of instrumental solutions, nor to 
convince others that such solutions matter, but rather to question technical regime conventions and 
to debate the critical implications of sustainable energy when understood in new ways (Smith et al., 
2016). These types of initiatives can be framed theoretically through Critical Theory (Feenberg, 
2002) in so far as they activate processes that make it apparent the social structure dominating an 
issue and propose actions to liberate people from such dominance. 
i) Informal networks and social movements  
Informal networks and social movements are often very important to the development of CAIs for 
the energy transition. Sustainability movements focused around finding more sustainable ways of 
living and informal networks of people often play the role of drivers and motivators of these 
initiatives (see the case study represented by the Cloughjordan Ecovillage, in Ooms et al., 2017, 13-
17). Supporting networks may be networks of individuals or of associations which might in their turn 
be supported by local administrators. Social movements and network initiatives in this area are often 
the result of initiatives undertaken by citizen denouncing problems generated by over-
professionalization, privatization and lack of a real commitment to sustainability from major energy 
suppliers (De Moor, 2013)4. 
j) Gender  
Gender studies in the field of CAIs for the energy transition result to be relatively scarce. One study 
that could be identified in this area focuses mostly on investments involved in renewable electricity 
production by citizen participation schemes in Germany (Fraun, 2015). This study reveals 
differences between men and women in the ownership of citizen participation schemes, in the 
average investment sum and in the decision-making bodies. Factors responsible for these differences 
 
4 On networks, see cases A1, A2 and A3 as described in Ooms et al. (2017).  
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are clearly context dependent and result from a combination of cultural, social and political aspects 
which can reinforce and strengthen gender inequalities. The narrow focus on technical and economic 
aspects of mainstream research and policy approaches adopted in this area often impedes a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics at stake. 
3.3 Looking for a working definition of CAIs: results from a focus group 
A prerequisite for COMETS research activities is a joint understanding of what CAIs are and the 
boundaries (see Chapter 2) that distinguish a collective experience to be considered as a CAI from 
other similar collective experiences. With this aim, besides the wide literature review already 
reported in the previous section, the following two paragraphs presented the main results of 
facilitated small group discussions organized, within a wider workshop, in the second day of the 
COMETS Kick-Off Meeting held in Torino on May, 20-21, 2019.  
All COMETS partners took part in the activity. They were randomly assigned to four different groups 
and asked to discuss two main topics related to this deliverable: 
• Which collective experiences can be considered as CAIs in the energy field? 
• How (i.e. through which dimensions and indicators) can their development be described and 
their performance measured?  
Below are the main findings and issues raised from the groups’ discussions. A short summary of the 
main agreed conclusions is provided at the end of the paragraph. On the basis of the groups’ 
discussions, the most relevant aspects to be covered in the definition and description of CAIs are the 
following:  
Developing a shared definition  
• Working definition: seeking a shared definition should be understood as a working definition 
and should be set as wide as possible.  
• Regularly updated: since the definition will be fed by surveys, case studies and other project 
research activities, it needs to be updated throughout the project implementation. The 
question is to which extent a wide definition can be accepted and become useful:  
• Relation to the energy transition: a definition of CAIs should build on activities related to the 
energy transition, which go beyond the activities related to transitioning from a fossil fuel-
based to a low-carbon energy system (i.e. increase of renewable energies). The basic 
requirement is that many people engage in some way to act in the energy sector towards the 
energy transition. The definition should also enable the possibility to measure impact on social 
innovation and the energy transition. 
 
 
Various aspects to be considered 
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• Different scopes of CAIs: experiences active in the reduction of energy production, including 
energy savings, storage of energy, energy efficiency increases, material for energy, built-in 
energy (e.g. into buildings and infrastructure), behavioral change and change of expectations 
about how much energy is needed for a ‘good’ life should be considered. Alternative initiatives, 
such as e-mobility (e.g. electrical bike-sharing, charging from the grid - even though it could 
originate from fossil fuels) should also be included;  
• Typologies: there are various typologies that differentiate based on the types of activities (e.g. 
consumer cooperatives, production cooperatives, distribution cooperatives) and whose 
characteristics may sensibly vary across countries; 
• Evolution of CAIs: it includes examples such as district heating moving into IT, cooperatives 
that developed out of anti-nuclear campaigns and now active in the Energy Transition CAIs, 
etcetera; 
• Decision-making processes: the internal processes play a role in defining a shared initiative as 
collective (i.e. democratic, participative) but still has to be decided to what extent actors 
involved should have the ability to influence decision-making (e.g. incorporating concepts 
such as one share, one vote or other democratic procedures). Oftentimes a plurality of actors 
(citizens) is involved and a key role is played by the initiator of a CAI. A big point is whether a 
particular CAI should still be considered without paying attention to the involvement of other 
social actors (i.e. private companies)5 that actually governs the initiative; 
• Social innovation: role of social innovation in challenging the status quo and the incumbent 
system (e.g. ESP initiatives to set/control prices). The potential for social innovation, which 
could be big, null or not measurable, is key to this investigation; 
• Alternative aspects: other areas to be considered may include the degree of voluntarism, limits 
to membership (physical, location-wise, financial), educational components, the role of 
profits/earning of money and types of benefits. 
Energy sector components to consider: 
• Impact: The direct connection and impact on the energy field has to be considered as a 
requirement. Many ‘collective’ experiences may have only an indirect impact on energy and 
possibly not easy to grasp if it is having any side effect on the overall system. For example, 
investigating whether or not an initiative with a strong energy saving component is impactful 
due to efficiency side effects or due to the initiative itself6; 
 
5 For example, financing platforms facilitating the financing of projects through increasing the number of members. Some 
projects may be financed through a platform that may be promoted by a company (‘community of investors’). However, it 
is possibly considered a form of social innovation insofar as the platforms are creating communities; people can also invest 
directly which is a form of empowerment. Funding platforms could be either be seen as CAIs themselves or as tools for CAIs. 
6 An example of a CAI that may or may not be considered is: coordination among owners of apartments in a building (e.g. 
as common in Estonia). Such an initiative is composed by citizens and will impact energy consumption/savings through 
agreeing, e.g., on renovating the building and installing new heating devices. It was suggested to consider these, unless they 
are forced by law to take action. 
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• Production: setting a threshold for the minimum and maximum capacity installed - or 
alternatively - based on relative expressions with respect to size (e.g. minimum/maximum 
energy production per capita for the members/households of CAIs). 
• Supply chain: all areas of the energy supply chain should be considered - from production and 
distribution to purchase and savings - embracing the full spectrum of engagement in the 
energy sector; 
• Involvement of renewables: in some initiatives, activity is mainly focused on reducing prices, 
so that the ‘transition’ element (e.g. emissions reduction) is missing in the intentions of 
participants.  
Based on what discussed and reported above, a general agreement has been reached on looking for 
descriptors that relate to the organizational structure and history of the initiatives, to their 
performance and quantified contribution to the energy transition and to the need of gathering 
meaningful contextual data. Defining CAIs may have several major fallacies: the definition may be 
overly broad; the definition may be too narrow or; it may lead to mutually exclusive, 
incomprehensible or circular definition. 
Therefore, a first set of properties have been identified: 
• size and location (urban/rural dimension, economic and social environment); 
• technologies invented/adopted/diffused; 
• mission statements and co-benefits expressed; 
• business models developed/deployed; 
• types and scales of energy services provided; 
• organizational models chosen; 
• decision-making processes followed. 
We therefore define Collective Action Initiatives as an integration of all these strands: undertaking 
social innovation aimed at transformative change – social, cultural and technological - in dominant 
regimes through a combination of predominantly local action and participation in trans-local 
networks that enact - either consciously and involuntarily - core values relating to sustainability 
and/or social justice and inclusion. 
In general, a strong fragmentation across initiatives can be observed: CAIs tend to develop separately 
from each other as small entities, in different locations, often specialized in a single type of 
renewables (solar, wind or biogas) or in energy saving, a single type of collective action (e.g. 
production, distribution, investment, education), or a special focus (e.g. a specific hardware or 
software, network solutions vs. off-grid solutions, high technology vs. low technology). Furthermore, 
there is a boundedness of the field of activities. The focus of CAIs in the energy sector tends to be on 
energy production and distribution, whereas there is much potential in synergizing with CAIs in 
related fields such as building, transport and food – therefore CAIs with a more holistic approach 
connecting various fields (such as transition initiatives or ecovillages) are not well represented in 
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renewable energy networks like REScoop. Finally, CAIs are confronted with the challenge of 
spreading and scaling: the development of CAIs is strongly context-dependent (depending on social 
capital, leadership, communication and visibility, the maturity of the culture of participation, 
regulatory specificities, local and regional political and economic situation, etc.) and cannot spread 
and scale based on a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Some open questions are raised from the discussion and will be taken into account along the next 
stages of the project development: 
•  Should CAI be considered if members are private companies (e.g. GreenCoop in Slovakia)? 
•  Should worker cooperatives be included? For example, in Sweden coops were funded by private 
companies to enable wind park investments for employees. 
•  Should crowdfunding models be included? E.g. Énergie Partagée in France, Zelena Energetska 
Zadruga in Croatia. They enable citizens to invest into renewable energy without the need to be a 
member. Cooperatives act as finance manager. 
•  What about projects initiated by cities (e.g. in France to enable citizen investment; ‘Energy Clusters’ 
in Poland)? 
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3.4 Looking for a working definition of CAIs: examples of CAIs in the energy field in Europe  
As a follow-up of the group discussions reported in the previous paragraph, all the participants were requested to ‘apply’ their approach to CAIs by 
providing some paradigmatic examples (taken from their own country) of collective experience that could be considered as examples of a CAI. The 
table below presents the results of this exploration, with basic descriptions of the specific experiences (columns A, B and D, respectively country, 
name and link to the website), a brief description about the main activity and the extent to which a collective perspective is implemented (column 
C) and a final evaluation about whether or not it can be a CAI. 
 
A. Country 
B. Name of 
CAI 
C. Description: activity and collective profile D. Link 
E. Is it an 
example of 
CAI? 
Norway METSA Group 
Metsä Group produces over 15% of the renewable energy in Finland. In 2018, it 
produced a total of 29 TWh of renewable energy of which a majority, 25 TWh, 
was used in their own production. One would need to check whether it is 
organized in the cooperative model. 
https://www.metsagroup.com/en/Sustainability/climate-and-
nature/bioenergy/Pages/bioenergy.aspx  
Maybe 
Denmark 
Kalvebod 
Smart Village 
A garden community that decided to create an energy community by putting 
solar panels on their community house. A clear collective action movement with 
democratic voice and social cohesion around and energy project. 
http://voresomstilling.dk/projekt/hf-kalvebod-smart-
village/140  
Yes 
Denmark 
Energy Lab 
Nordhavn 
There is a lot of discussion and research about creating an energy community 
around Nordhavn and the private Copenhagen International School (which has 
a facade completely covered with solar panels). However, this is an example of 
a tech push by the private sector, research institutes and universities, and the 
Copenhagen Solution Lab (part of the municipality). It hasn't been initiated by 
the local residents and so far there is no evidence that they are even interested 
in being part of an energy community. 
http://www.energylabnordhavn.com/  No 
Denmark 
The energy 
collective 
project 
This is a tech push initiative and isn't really a collective action. Rather, it is an 
organization that facilitates energy collectives by offering blockchain support.  
https://the-energy-collective-project.com/  No 
Denmark Svalin 
This is a local energy community. However, it is a demonstration project 
initiated by research institutes rather than the community and so the residents 
didn't necessarily have the ambition, impetus, or economic risk guarantee. 
https://weou.org/energy-collective/  Maybe 
Denmark 
Samsø Energy 
Academy 
Originally the Samsø island was the shining example of a collective action 
initiative that resulted in a 100% renewable energy island and collectively 
owned wind turbines. It has since morphed into the Energy Academy which 
provides support, education and outreach to other communities 
https://energiakademiet.dk/  Maybe 
Spain 
Arterra 
Bizimodu  
Ecovillage that works on many environmental and social aspects. They have a 
project on biogas and they are starting a photovoltaic project. 
https://arterrabizimodu.org  Yes 
Spain 
The different 
municipalities 
part of 
Ecoolocal 
Several municipalities that work with the civil society and tech support from 
ecooo, to work on energy at local level. 
http://ecooo.es/ecooolocal/procesos/  Yes 
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Spain Viure de l'aire First eolic community project in Spain http://www.viuredelaire.cat/en/  Yes 
Spain Som Movilitat Cooperative project that create local groups on sustainable shared mobility. https://www.sommobilitat.coop/en/  Yes 
Italy E' nostra 
First Italian energy cooperative able to both produce and supply electricity as 
well to assist its members providing energy services for energy efficiency. 
Started in 2014 as the first Italian supply coop, merged in 2018 with Retenergie, 
one of the oldest and biggest Italian energy coop. 
https://www.enostra.it/  Yes 
Italy Retenergie 
Energy coop founded in 2008 "to contribute to a new economy based on 
principles of environmental sustainability, sobriety and solidarity". Developed 
and owned several renewable generation plants (mainly PV) and provided to its 
members other energy services including energy audits, collective purchasing 
schemes.  
http://www.retenergie.it/  Yes 
Italy 
We for green 
sharing 
Italian multi-utility which developed several energy coops: first PV plan 
developed in 2010 (Energyland), then two others in 2011 and 2015 (Masseria 
del Sole, Fattorie del Sole). More recently a hydropower plant. Also offers 
participation in electricity purchase group (even without the need to invest).  
https://www.weforgreen.it/  Yes 
Italy 
Energia 
Positiva 
A newer energy coop started operating in 2015 buying existing PV plants and 
opening ownership to its members. It currently owns 14 plants, has 270 
members participating with a total of 3 million euros raised by members. They 
also act as a purchasing group of electricity. Energy efficiency 
pilot projects are under development. 
https://www.energia-positiva.it/  Yes 
Italy Civico 5.0 
Initiative promoted by Legambiente (Italian environmental association) to 
improve energy efficiency of block of flats. It selected 25 families (2 per block of 
flats) and offered to them several audits: energy efficiency, indoor pollution, 
indoor gas emissions, noise pollution. At the end of the audit process they 
offered the families practical solutions to improve any of the above, in terms of 
technical solutions and economics. No implementation, only audit, information 
and awareness creation. The programme has ended in 2019 and will be 
replicated. 
https://civicocinquepuntozero.it/  Maybe 
Italy 
"Territorio 
Sostenibile" 
Oil Free Zone 
Aimed at creating the Energy Community of the Pinerolo Area. First effort to 
take advantage of the Italian law regulating (or at least defining) the so-called 
Oil Free Zones. The covenant was signed on last 15 April 2019. 25 Municipalities 
signed so far (out of around 40 of the Pinerolo Area). The Pinerolo Area is 1,350 
square km and has 150,000 inhabitants. 
NA Yes 
Italy 
Abbassa la 
bolletta 
Purchasing power group promoted by Altrocomsumo (Italian 
association for protection and awareness of consumers) aimed at gathering 
energy consumers in order to bargain better retail electricity and gas prices 
on the market. In the last round of subscriptions they gathered 60.000 
consumers and over 10.000 have subscribed a new contract for electricity and 
gas provision benefiting of a saving of 310euros on their annual energy bills. The 
initiative is now closed. 
https://www.altroconsumo.it/landing/abbassa-la-
bolletta?partnerkey=aclpd  
Maybe 
Spain 
Network for 
Energy 
Sovereignty – 
Barcelona 
Xarxa per la sobirania energètica (Xse) Catalonia emerged when different 
organisations and individuals identified energy-related problems affecting local 
populations, including fracking, the managing of hydroelectric dams by private 
corporations and extremely high voltage power lines, and the building of a 
pipeline through Catalonia to transport gas from Algeria to Europe. It also 
wanted to challenge government obstruction of renewable energies, 
and collusion with companies that creates some of the highest electricity prices 
https://transformativecities.org/atlas-of-utopias/atlas-11/  Yes 
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in Europe. This is an example of social innovation and not just a new energy-
related business model. 
Italy 
Solidarity 
Purchasing 
Groups (GAS) 
and Solidarity 
Economy 
Districts 
(DES) 
GAS and DES represent a great example of social innovation where societal 
issues become the direct driver to reduce carbon footprint. 
http://www.co-energia.org/  Yes 
International 
City and 
energy as a 
commons 
Activities being developed in relation to commons around Bologna Regulation 
represents important examples of new governance models which are relevant 
for the energy transition. 
https://labgov.city/tag/cogovernance/  No 
Poland 
Spółdzielnia 
Nasza Energia 
(eng. Our 
Energy 
Cooperative) 
The first energy cooperative in Poland (from 2014). It was initiated by the 
company BIOPower. It is based on the cooperation of four municipalities from 
the Zamość poviat: Komarów-Osada, Sitno, Skierbieszów, Łabunie. An energy 
node consisting of three biogas plants. The shareholders are local farmers and 
municipalities. 
http://biopower.home.pl/o-firmie/  Maybe 
Poland 
Wspólnota 
Mieszkaniowa 
Pszczelna 
(eng. Housing 
Community 
Pszczelna) 
24 kW photovoltaic roof system was implemented (96 solar panels). The 
shareholders are all members of the housing community (apartments owners). 
http://www.administrator24.info/artykul/id10152,szczecinska-
pszczelna-z-wlasna-elektrownia  
Yes 
Poland 
Wrocławska 
Elektrownia 
Słoneczna 
(eng. 
Wroclaw 
Solar Power 
Plant) 
Panels cover a total area of 0.5 ha. The power plant will produce 700,000 kWh 
annually. The shareholders are all members of the housing community 
(apartments owners). 
https://wroclaw-poludnie.pl/  Yes 
Spain SOMobilitat 
Cooperative project that promotes a sustainable mobility. They share electric 
vehicles (cars, vans, ...) in each community/neighborhood. 
https://www.sommobilitat.coop/  Yes 
Spain GoiEner 
GoiEner is a cooperative project for the generation and consumption of 
renewable energy. 
https://www.goiener.com/  Yes 
Spain OCU 
They make collective purchases of electricity and gas with citizens who join their 
initiative, but the decision is not made by citizens. Also, they don´t ‘give 
importance’ to the kind of energy (renewable or not) they buy, the price is 
prioritized. 
https://www.ocu.org/especiales/quieropagarmenosluz/  No 
Spain Trabensol 
Cooperative of Senior Cohousing in a building "bioclimatic, geothermal, with 
little environmental impact and low energy consumption". 
 Yes 
Belgium 
Buurzame 
Stroom 
LEC - Neighborhood initiative, tenants, owners and businesses. rooftop lending 
to install solar panels for electricity production sharing in the community 
http://buurzamestroom.energent.be/  Yes 
Belgium Allons en vent 
Cooperative, the cooperants of which invested in windmills for their children. 
Also involved in other cooperative schemes such as bio-food, eco-construction, 
education and art & culture  
https://allonsenvent.be/ 
http://www.vents-houyet.be/realisations.html 
Yes 
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Box 1 - Looking for a working definition of CAIs: main findings from the experiences investigated 
There are several types of initiatives that can be considered under the umbrella of collective action. Initiatives are scrutinized by looking at their 
organizing structure — whether they are developed and managed bottom-up or top-down. Out of the 32 initiatives listed, the majority are 
accepted as collective action initiatives in the energy sector (20 ‘Yes’). These include projects that are clearly initiated and managed by citizens, 
such as the Housing Community Pszczelna in Poland. However, not all can be considered collective action (5 ‘No’), as highlighted in the Danish 
Energy Lab Nordhavn, which is an example of a tech push by the private sector, research institutes and universities, and the Copenhagen Solution 
Lab (part of the municipality). This was initiated by the local residents but so far there is no evidence that they are interested in being part of an 
energy community. Some of the initiatives are in a gray zone when being considered as a collective action initiative (7 ‘Maybe’), either because it 
was initiated top-down by an incumbent actor (gas companies, as exemplified in Poland by ‘Our Energy Cooperative’) or research institutes (seen 
in Denmark by Svalin). In these cases, it is difficult to have a definite ‘yes’ or ‘no’ because they still show signs of collective action by engaging 
citizens. They require more in-depth critique to establish whether or not they fall under the umbrella of collective action. 
 
 
 
Belgium Ecopower 
Cooperative, electricity production, cooperants are owners of the installations. 
Fair-fin label 
https://www.ecopower.be/  Maybe 
Belgium Ecloud 
DSO initiative to set up Community Virtual Power Plants in business parks. Aim 
to share means of production, increased energy efficiency and increased auto-
production, advantageous tariff schemes. Incumbent system initiative 
https://www.ores.be/entreprises-et-industries/faire-
economies/e-cloud-cooperer-dans-les-zonings-pour-une-
autoproduction-plus-efficace  
No 
Belgium 
Nieuwe 
Dokken 
LEC - urban development project (mixed residential/commercial) with 
underlying specific philosophy based on sustainability and renewable energies 
to adhere to when coming to live to the neighborhood 
https://denieuwedokken.be/  Yes 
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4 The four dimensions of collective action. Processes 
and effects of CAIs in the energy field 
The previous section showed how collective action in the field of energy can generate not only new 
forms of energy goods but also influence broader aspects of social life, which is commonly referred 
to as ‘social innovation’. In this section, we focus on the material processes of collective action and 
attempt to apply it to the model of collective action drawn in Section 2.6: interests; organization; 
mobilisation and resources’ control; and opportunities/threats. 
4.1 Interests, motivations and values 
People act together when expectations of some return in terms of money, improvement of individual 
or social and environmental well-being, equality, solidarity and other values are on the horizon. All 
these, apart from money, show that people involved in collective action are attracted by the 
possibility to generate collective goods. These may be both traditional collective goods that have been 
turned toward privatization (e.g. water, public spaces, food) and new forms of goods, such as 
information, science, mobility, and energy. In the second section, we contended the idea that interests 
are the moving principle of collective action that is too bent towards individualism and rationalism. 
If we share the idea that all that is generated and reproduced in daily life is collectively made (but 
individually appropriated), interests and motivations to act collectively are immanent to the daily life 
activities of all people (Sennett, 2012). The motivation is to cooperate, even if the market forces 
trying to bend them to an individualistic logic have influenced many of these actions. Production and 
consumption are thus seen as collective activities that can be deployed collectively and be managed 
independently of other entities, such as private enterprises or the state. 
As argued by Alan Page Fiske (1992), people are fundamentally sociable - they generally organize 
their social life in terms of their relations with other people. Fiske postulates that people in all 
cultures use four relational models to generate most kinds of social interaction, evaluation, and affect. 
Cultures use different rules to implement the four models. The motivation, planning, production, 
comprehension, coordination, and evaluation of human social life may be based largely on 
combinations of the four models:  
• communal sharing, people treat all members of a category as equal; 
• authority ranking, people attend to their positions in a linear ordering; 
• equality matching, people keep track of the imbalances among them; 
• market pricing, people organize their interactions with reference to ratios of this metric, so 
what matters is how a person stands in proportion to others.  
The relational models theory explains social life as a process of seeking, making, sustaining, repairing, 
adjusting, judging, construing, and sanctioning relationships. It postulates that people are oriented 
to relationships as such, that people generally want to relate to each other, feel committed to the 
basic types of relationships, regard themselves as obligated to abide by them, and impose them on 
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other people (including third parties). Thus, people construct complex and varied social forms using 
combinations of these four models, implemented through diverse cultural norms and rules. People's 
chief social conceptions, concerns, and coordinating criteria, as well as their primary purposes and 
principles, are usually derived from the four models. This means that people's intentions with regard 
to other people are essentially sociable, and their social goals are inherently relational. People 
interact with others in order to construct and participate in one or another of the four basic types of 
social relationships.  
Collective action is aimed to make collective goods - ‘Goods’ in the sense of being social objects of 
value, (whether tangible or not) that satisfy given socially determined needs, desires and aspirations. 
They are collective goods, in the sense that they are use value to a plurality (De Angelis, 2017). An 
airport lounge, for example, is a use value to a plurality, as is any public space, such as an aqueduct, 
a train, a park, a school or a street. Also, any mass-produced commodity is a use value to a plurality 
in the sense that it serves the necessary or acquired needs of a subset of a population, although this 
cup, this computer, this car is a use value only to the user. What is common to all these cases is that 
the plurality is largely silent - it is just a passive user or consumer of these goods. To make it a 
collective or common good, the plurality needs to emerge as a plurality of commoners, by claiming 
ownership of that good. To claim ownership is not simply a question of defining property rights in 
the legal sense. A plurality that claims ownership of one or more goods is one that, in different forms, 
given situations and contexts, not only uses or accesses that use value, but that also governs its 
production and reproduction, its sustainability and development. In doing so, the plurality shapes a 
relationship with that good and with the environment in which it is produced, while the subjects of 
that plurality govern the relations with one another. 
However, to attain collective action is not a simple effort. Collective action has been, in some way, 
taken from people, or in another perspective, it has been delegated to other agents, such as private 
enterprises or states. Thus, a mix of conditions and situations that COMETS will investigate supports 
its development. In the end, rationally acting subjects meet on the market to realise their rational 
interests, whereas, in fact, they act as executors in accordance with social laws which they themselves 
have generated historically and reproduce through their rational behaviour and over which they 
have no control (Adorno, 1990). Some interests and needs can find satisfaction also out of collective 
action. But collective action is a need that goes beyond its immediate process. Collective action 
challenges this appropriation of its outcomes by other agents, all competing on the market. 
4.2 The organizational process 
4.2.1 Energy communities and cooperatives: organizational forms and conventional 
approaches to collective action 
Current literature usually refers to collective action in the energy field as community energy 
initiatives (Walker et al., 2010; Seyfang et al., 2013; Wirth, 2014; Yildiz et al., 2015), which are often 
organized in the form of energy cooperatives. We often see cooperatives as the more diffuse form of 
organizational bodies. Energy cooperatives can be clearly defined beyond ‘energy community’ for a 
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couple of reasons. Firstly, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) provides a set of seven 
Principles that are commonly used to characterize the structural goals of cooperatives. These Seven 
Principles of the Cooperative Identity are (International Cooperative Alliance, 2018):  
1. Voluntary and open membership; 
2. Democratic member control; 
3. Member economic participation; 
4. Autonomy and independence (from external companies, investors and governmental 
institutions); 
5. Providing education, training and information (for members); 
6. Cooperation among cooperatives (to promote the cooperative movement); 
7. Concern for (the external) community 
Secondly, most member states of the European Union provide a specific legal business form for 
cooperatives within their national legislation, which often reflects the principles set out by the ICA 
(Roberts et al., 2014; Cocolina, 2016; European Parliament, 2019). Although there is diversity across 
legal forms in different countries, strong participation of members in decision-making is the most 
commonly adopted feature in all national legislations. A detailed description is given in the following 
paragraphs.  
While the definition of energy cooperatives is clear, the situation varies across energy communities. 
The heterogeneity in the sector has led to a variety of different definitions. According to the 
International Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA) Coalition for Action, energy projects are counted 
as community energy if they fulfil two of the following three elements (IRENA Coalition, 2018):  
1. Local stakeholders own the majority or all of a renewable energy project; 
2. Voting control rests with a community-based organization; 
3. The majority of social and economic benefits are distributed locally.  
As can be seen from all these elements, a strong focus on the locality of these (renewable) energy 
projects is key to the definition of community energy. Hicks and Ison (2018) go beyond these three 
elements, characterizing community energy along five spectra, which include:  
1. Range of actors (from local individuals to international institutions/companies); 
2. Distribution of voting rights and balance of decision-making power; 
3. Distribution of financial benefits; 
4. Scale of technology (from adjusted to local needs to focus on maximizing profit); 
5. Level of community engagement. 
Walker and Devine-Wright (2008) proposed a framework of analysis to characterize community 
energy projects, identifying two key dimensions: the process dimension, interpreted as “who the 
project is developed and run by […]”; and the outcome dimension, i.e. “[...] who the project is for and 
benefits in economic and social terms [...]”. By taking advantage of the work of Candelise and Ruggieri 
(2017), community energy initiatives span between two extreme situations, as seen in Figure 3. The 
bottom left quadrant includes the cases in which a project is developed by an institution external to 
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the community, with minimal or no involvement of citizens, and only producing returns for the 
institution and its shareholders (e.g. a utility developed wind farm). On the opposite side of the 
spectrum there are the projects highlighting citizens’ participation, which aim to bring returns and 
collective benefits to local communities. While recognizing the possibility of several possible 
combinations of processes and outcomes within the latter, the authors identify different typologies 
of projects, i.e. those that place more emphasis on the participative nature of the process (viewpoint 
A), while others are more concerned with the redistribution among citizens of the project benefits 
(viewpoint B) (Candelise and Ruggieri, 2017).  
 
Figure 3 - Community energy – two dimensions. Understanding of community renewable energy in relation to project process 
and outcome dimensions (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). 
Candelise and Ruggieri (2017) also identifies the institutional characteristics of community energy 
initiatives as affected by two major features: 
• An economic element (as community energy initiatives are organizations operating in the 
energy market which can create revenues for their members); 
• A community/participatory element. 
The overall institutional structure of community energy initiatives can be affected by the relative 
weight of these two elements, which can skew them toward more market- or community-based logics 
in their dynamics of development and operation (Candelise and Ruggieri, 2017). 
In general, it is relevant to highlight how organizational structure of collective action initiatives and 
- within that - the choice of the legal form is affected not just by the dynamics of creation, motivations 
and objectives of the initiative, but also by the legal framework of the specific country in which they 
are developed (e.g. possibility for tax exemption, member participation and decision-making 
processes, re-distribution of profits, codifying of goals for the enterprise). 
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The Council of European Energy Regulators (2019) has identified three different types of CAIs 
regarding their operations: 
• Community owned generation assets (the most common type of energy community). They do 
not self-consume and sell the energy to a supplier. The income is shared or reinvested.  
• Virtual sharing over the grid. They own and manage assets, share the profits and the energy 
produced among their members. They can be organized through a common supplier that is 
in charge of matching between production and consumption and supplies additional energy 
if it is needed. 
Sharing of local production through community grids. The energy is physically shared through a 
community grid (island or islanded space). 
There is a wide variety of technologies and strategies adopted by different energy communities 
(Oteman et al., 2014). Dominant technologies in this respect include wind turbines, photovoltaics 
(PV) and bio-energy (bio-gas) (Moss et al., 2015). From a survey of energy communities within the 
UK, Seyfang et al. (2013) found that solar PV was by far the most common technology, followed by 
solar thermal, heat pumps, onshore wind, biomass, followed by hydropower. Solar is also the 
dominant technology for energy cooperatives in Germany, however it is not at all prominent in 
Denmark or the Netherlands, where wind power is more popular (Oteman et al., 2014). 
Some initiatives, such as the Transition Towns in the UK, do not advocate for specific technologies. 
Instead, they emphasize the need to transition away from fossil fuel sources (Seyfang and Haxeltine, 
2012). Likewise, the Energiewende (energy transition) in Germany was influenced by elements 
within the civil society that opposed nuclear power after the 2011 Fukushima disaster (Moss et al., 
2015). 
Energy communities foster and strive for economic goals (e.g., reducing home energy bills, generating 
income for the communities, reducing energy poverty, local economic development, skills 
development, and job creation), environmental goals (e.g., reducing carbon emissions, improving the 
local environment), social goals (e.g., health and wellbeing, education, social cohesion, social 
inclusion, volunteerism), political goals (e.g., community empowerment, influencing energy policy, 
community leadership), and infrastructural goals (e.g., energy independence, building 
refurbishment). Out of all these goals, the top three found to be most significant in energy 
communities were reducing household energy bills, reducing emissions, and energy independence 
(Seyfang et al., 2013). 
4.2.2 Legal forms and governance structure 
The legal form can provide valuable initial information within the process dimension, specifically on 
the organizational structure of a CAI. Legal forms can generally be classified into three categories 
depending on their relevance for renewable energy CAI:  
1) legal forms that require some form of participative decision-making structure, such as the 
‘one member – one vote’ principle (the category with the highest relevance);  
2) legal forms that allow for participative structures (but not required);  
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3) legal forms that do not allow participative structures (the least relevant).  
Cooperatives are the most common legal form used in the European community energy sector 
(Huybrechts and Mertens, 2014; Yildiz et al., 2015) and are generally deemed to provide the best 
institutional framework for locally owned and participatory approaches to renewable energy 
projects. They encompass both the social and economic dimension in their scope and are 
characterised by a ‘one member – one vote’ decision making process, thus providing high levels of 
co-determination (ILO, 2013; Viardot, 2013; Huybrechts and Mertens, 2014; Yildiz et al., 2015). Out 
of the 28 EU member states, plus Norway and Switzerland, 17 countries have national laws that 
strictly require the ‘one member – one vote’ principle for cooperatives. Three countries (Sweden, 
Germany and Finland) additionally allow a proportional voting system, while Slovakian law only 
allows proportional votes based on membership shares. Luxembourg and Portugal generally adhere 
to the ‘one member – one vote’ concept, however it is possible for some members to obtain several 
votes and Poland only requires the one member – one vote principle for cooperatives with solely 
natural persons as members. Lastly, 6 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, Malta and the 
Netherlands) do not require specific governance structures (Cocolina, 2016; European Parliament, 
2019). 
Depending on the national legal framework, other potentially relevant legal forms are associations, 
(limited) partnerships and foundations or trusts. In several countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, 
associations and cooperatives are combined into the same legal form (forening/förening). In other 
cases these are separate legal entities, for instance the German ‘eingetragene Genossenschaft’ 
(cooperative) and ‘eingetragener Verein’ (association). Partnerships on the other hand are common 
legal forms for CAIs in Denmark, especially in the wind energy sector (Wierling et al., 2018). An 
‘Interessentskap’ in Denmark can be set up by a minimum of two legal or natural persons. Equal 
voting rights are allowed, but not required for this legal form. CAIs in the form of trust can be found 
in the United Kingdom, as so called ‘community development trusts’ (Seyfang et al., 2013). These are 
commonly set up with similar structures as a limited shareholding company, however instead of 
shareowners it has members. Members generally have the right to vote, however this right can be 
restricted to a specific group of members (Wilcox, 2019). 
The legal form can furthermore provide information on the outcome dimension. Certain legal forms 
may require the generation and distribution of specific societal benefits. This is the case for the 
Swedish law, which differentiates between ‘ekonomisk förening’ (economic association) and ‘ideell 
förening’ (non-profit association). The ekonomisk förening is required mainly to promote its 
members’ financial interests, whereas the ‘ideel förening’ is not allowed to generate profits for its 
members but rather generate non-monetary societal benefits (Bolagsverket, 2019a, 2019b). A 
similar classification can be found in the United Kingdom, where the legislation differentiates 
between the ‘cooperative society (co-op)’ and the ‘community benefit society (bencom)’. The first, 
again, focuses on the member’s financial interests while the second focuses on community benefits 
(BIS, 2011).  
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While the specific governance structure varies depending on national legislation, the participative 
nature of cooperatives is generally ensured through a general assembly, which convenes at regular 
intervals. For smaller cooperatives, the general assembly may directly manage its affairs. Larger 
cooperatives tend to have a board of directors, which is elected by the general assembly. Some 
national legislations, however, always require a board of directors. Additionally, a supervisory 
council may be required (European Parliament, 2019). In order to operationalize the governance 
structure for CAIs, COMETS will develop a ranking between different governance structures. 
4.2.3 Example of energy community organizational processes: Italy 
The main message from Candelise and Ruggieri (2017) in terms of organizational structure and 
financing of community energy initiatives in Italy can be condensed as follows:  
• Initiatives are quite heterogeneous in terms of dynamics of creation and organizational 
structure;  
• The sample (in Italy) is quite small so not that easy to characterize and define prevailing 
structures and practices; 
• Several initiatives are top-down, with an emerging role of local authorities as proponents; 
• The cooperative is the prevailing legal form, although evidence shows that it is not a 
guarantee of high levels of citizens participation to the initiative: citizens ownership is not 
necessarily higher in cooperatives versus limited companies; 
• The prevailing financing structure is equity from citizens, with some role for local banks in 
providing debt for larger projects. 
Similar analysis has been done for other EU countries, e.g. Germany (Yildiz, 2014; Yildiz et al., 2015) 
and the UK (Seyfang et al., 2013). 
4.3 Resource control and mobilization: identifying dimensions and explanatory 
dimensions 
As a starting point in operationalizing the concept of CAIs, it could be useful to pinpoint the following 
processes of mobilization that aim to exercise control upon resources needed for collective action. 
Resource control and the way it is implemented are fundamental for supporting mobilization and for 
having shared benefits. The nature of resources mobilized by the collective are also crucial to 
understand the features of collective action dynamics. For example, the fact that benefits are 
monetary or non-monetary is interesting to understand what the goals of collective action are.  
1. Community energy initiatives have the following characteristics: 
• A form of citizens ownership or financing of an energy project; 
• Citizens directly benefit from the outcomes of the initiative. 
 
2. Other initiatives, which do not fall in the definition of community energy above, i.e. citizens 
do not own or finance them necessarily (e.g. associations, grassroots initiatives for climate 
change reduction or fuel poverty alleviation) and where the objectives and the outcomes of 
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the initiative do not necessarily benefit their members, but is the benefit of a wider audience 
or a wider cause related to the energy transition.  
Community energy initiatives are the most studied and have most data, usually regarding the actions 
driven by collectives and the outcomes they can generate. They can be structured and characterized 
in different ways, focusing on different types of activities and deliver different combinations of 
outcomes. They can be local or have a larger geographical scope. This indeed has an impact on their 
organizational, financing and economic structures. That is why COMETS proposes the two-dimension 
figure below (from Candelise and Ruggieri, 2017) to characterize them along the process and the 
outcome dimension. These two dimensions are further described with the use of explanatory 
variables indicated in the next section in order to develop more detailed data and information to 
better characterize and analyze their organizational structure and its implications. 
In Figure 4, the process dimension (intended as the set of variables and elements which define how 
the initiative has been set up, why and how) spans from initiatives that are more market-based and 
less participative in their process, to those more driven by community logic. Along the outcome 
dimension, initiatives differentiate themselves by the type of benefits offered, i.e. monetary benefits 
(such as economic returns on investment or electricity bills savings), or non-monetary benefits (such 
as energy services or educational activities), or a combination of the two. 
 
Figure 4- Characterizing community energy along the Process and Outcome dimensions (Candelise and Ruggieri, 2017) 
CAIs and the energy transition: Naturally, a prerequisite to the classification along the Process and 
Outcome dimensions is the relevance of the CAI for the energy transition. Contributions to the energy 
transition can be associated to activities in the generation, distribution, trade and consumption of 
renewable energy, energy poverty reduction, awareness raising or the smart energy sector 
(Bauwens, 2019). Additional relevant contributions involve activities in the transport and energy 
efficiency sectors. Thus, the topic of ‘energy transition’ is rather an identifying dimension, as it limits 
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the scope for CAIs. Whereas ‘Social innovation’ is an explanatory dimension, as it describes new 
qualitative forms of CAIs. 
In order to evaluate the strength of resource control management, further investigation of the 
organizational structures and financial issues of CAIs in Europe is needed. Evidence will be gathered 
along the COMETS project and the outcome dimensions identified above will be further classified into 
organizational and economic variables. 
The financing issue of CAIs is intrinsically connected to the organizational structure of a CAI and its 
legal form. Therefore, a discussion of financing and economic governance cannot be separated from 
the requirements given by the legal form. Of course, minimum share requirements and regulation on 
share distributions both influence the membership structure and the extent of participation.  
Funding strategies include the following: 
• Member-share financed. A typical strategy for energy cooperatives and most relevant way of 
financing in general. Concepts of member-share financing can vary, depending on the country 
and/or legal form. For instance, in the German ‘eingetragene Genossenschaft’, a member 
normally buys one or several shares upon becoming a member, with each share having a fixed 
price that rarely changes over the years. In Sweden, on the other hand, shares are often tied 
to the amount of kWh a member wishes to purchase per year, and the fee must be paid each 
year. As found by Wierling et al. (2018), the accumulated amount of shares in energy-related 
cooperatives in Germany is estimated to be about 600 Mill. Euro.  
• Bank loans or community loans (lending model). Strategy for community energy initiatives in 
general with strong local focus. Of course, the option for the lending model depends on the 
soundness of chosen legal structures and connected liability requirements. 
• Governmental subsidies, tax exemptions and other support-schemes. The viability of chosen 
business models is crucially connected to the sustained financial support as seen by the 
downturn of Danish energy cooperatives (Wierling et al., 2018).  
• Crowdfunding platforms. 
• Re-financing through economic returns.  
• Donations.  
The most important explanatory dimension for the extent of funding is the envisioned engagement 
in a renewable energy sector. While PV projects can be done on a small scale and, therefore, only 
require a modest investment, current wind project (in particular, offshore wind projects) cannot be 
started without considerable financial commitments and long-term financial planning. With the 
general increase in the size and complexity of renewable energy projects, the scope for ‘traditional’ 
collective action initiatives is thus shrinking, demanding an adoption of innovative business models 
in the future. 
4.4 Opportunities and threats. External conditions influencing CAIs development 
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There are many external conditions that influence CAIs creation and development. The motivations 
are diverse and differ from country to country, even between regions of the same country. This 
depends on their specific challenges, such as historical development of national energy markets and 
other cultural, economic and political factors. 
In general terms, concerning the facilitating factors, the presence of a strong environmental 
motivation of the key stakeholders involved is the presence of clear external financial incentives, and 
the presence of a social support system (for example in terms of sharing a common identity and 
ideas) have all worked as positive driving forces for the development of CAIs. (Carrus et al., 2019). A 
study in Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands demonstrates that an evolving institutional 
configuration of the energy sector strongly influences the available space for community initiative 
development (Oteman et al., 2014). Another study in Spain concludes that the cooperative tradition 
is one of the factors that impulse the emergence of energy cooperatives in Catalonia or the Basque 
Country (Jimenez et al., forthcoming). 
But there are also barriers to establish a collective initiative, such as the lack of awareness, 
community spirit and environmental concerns. Another big issue is legislation, especially legal 
uncertainty and many bureaucratic burdens individuals and collectives face when deciding to start 
an initiative. Thirdly, technological gaps still have to be closed, such as the stabilization of grid 
infrastructure (Carrus et al., 2019). 
4.4.1 The role of regulatory frameworks 
The regulatory framework plays an important role in the creation and development of CAIs. In the 
last decades, political and legal frameworks in all Europe have been designed to support an energy 
system based on centralised production using fossil fuels, in which citizens were passive consumers. 
But the role of consumers has changed and nowadays they are increasingly becoming ‘prosumers’, 
broadly ‘energy citizens’, drivers of the energy transition (Roberts et al., 2014) to a fairer, democratic, 
decentralised and with added social benefits energy (Friends of Earth Europe, 2018). In addition to 
this, some CAIs not only own the production of energy, but citizens are also now designing creative 
legal strategies to introduce themselves in the areas of grid ownership and management, and energy 
supply. 
An analysis of community ownership and participation in the production of renewable energy 
(Roberts et al., 2014) showed that CAIs take many different legal forms. The choice often relates to 
the goals of the particular community, including tax treatment, profits, or even laws and legal 
frameworks. Some illustrative examples are shown in this section. 
Nevertheless, citizens engagement in renewable energy production only found support in some local 
and national policies (Friends of Earth Europe, 2018). The community energy is less developed in 
Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, mainly due to the lack of supportive frameworks, or indeed 
some abrupt policy changes (withdrawal of support, sometimes retroactively). After 2000, changes 
in the EU energy policy provided some opportunities, such as the liberalisation of the electricity 
market. The Clean Energy Package, agreed by the EU in 2018, is a significant change. 
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The community energy movement received a boost through the EU´s 2030 climate and energy 
legislative framework that gives more chances for citizens to get involved in the energy transition, 
allowing communities and individuals the right to generate, store, consume and sell their own 
energy. 
The Clean Energy for all Europeans package includes the RED II (The Renewable Energy Directive II, 
directive 2018/2001/EU). The RED II aims to meet EU emissions reduction commitments under the 
Paris Agreement. The directive establishes a renewable energy target for 2030 of at least 32%, with 
a clause for a possible upward revision by 2023. EU countries are required to draft the 10-year 
National Energy & Climate Plans (NECPs) for 2021-2030, outlining how they will meet the new 2030 
targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency. This Directive is important for CAIs in the energy 
sector because it highlights: a) citizens and communities are stakeholders in the Energy System; b) 
citizens and communities have the right to produce, store, consume and sell renewable energy, and 
other rights such as consumers protection or access to all energy markets directly or through a third 
party; c) requires from the Member States a National Climate and Energy Plan; d) it simplifies 
administration and procedures.7 
As the concept of energy communities is varied, the approach and support by the legislative 
frameworks vary between Member States e.g. in the Netherlands it is established a regulatory 
exemption in licensing requirements for new business models, while in Germany there are special 
rules in action schemes for RES support (Tounquet et al., 2019). This emphasizes that Germany and 
Denmark support a more classical local renewable energy community business models, while the UK, 
the Netherlands and Poland support more innovative business models.  
An in-depth assessment of the treatment of energy communities in the 28 draft National Climate and 
Energy Plans (NECPs) was done by REScoop - the European federation of renewable energy 
cooperatives, in collaboration with the European University Viadrina (Roberts and Gauthier, 2019). 
The final plans will be due at the end of 2019 and have to be adopted by 30 June 2021. The analysis 
compiles relevant information about the NECPs. One of the conclusions is that most Member States 
positively acknowledge renewable energy communities (RECs) in their NECPs and some 
demonstrate their planned commitment. However, in most cases, this acknowledgment lacks 
concrete policies or measures. In the analysis of the NECPs, some Member States, like Greece, 
demonstrate a strong engagement with the role of energy communities in their energy system, 
whereas others, such as Sweden and Germany, completely ignore this role.  
Other recent studies investigate the connection between community energy and social innovation 
(Riutort Isern, 2015; Kent, 2018). The first study concludes that community energy can be a catalyst 
for a deeper social change, which goes beyond the impact on people´s energy behaviour. The 
processes of integrating and contesting led by the community energy initiatives influence the 
creation of new governance practices.  
 
7 For a simplified analisys of the RED II Directive see Friends of the Earth Europe (2018). 
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A recent study estimates that half of all the European Union citizens could be producing their own 
electricity by 2050 and meeting 45% of the EU´s energy demand (Delf, 2016). This would only be 
possible assuming that policy and regulatory barriers are removed and national grids, distribution 
networks and electricity markets are developed in parallel with the growth of renewable energy 
production, more storage options and flexible demand side management. 
Advances in technologies, telecommunications and data analytics provide CAIs new chances and 
opportunities. The digitalisation of the energy sector gives suppliers the opportunity to have a 
stronger relationship with consumers. The security and protection of these data should be 
completely guaranteed (Eurelectric, 2016) 
The structure of the energy sector is complex. It includes the relationships among energy production, 
energy storage, distribution, energy market and energy demand and consumption (Yarnal). 
However, the traditional European energy systems (in terms of its technical and commercial market 
design) and its regulatory framework, are organized according to a traditional value chain of 
production, transport, storage, and distribution of energy, that picture is now far from the reality due 
to the changes produced in the last years (Hoppe et al., 2018). 
4.4.2 Regulatory frameworks and the energy transition: examples across Europe  
Spain  
The collective energy consumption was specifically affected when the so-called ‘sun tax’ legislation 
introduced in 2015 imposed restrictions on shared residential self-consumption from PV systems. 
Consequently, self-consumption was only allowed for common elements, such as the garage, 
electricity in the staircases or elevators, and for individual neighbours having their own installation.  
This regulation was appealed against at the Constitutional Court by the Government of Catalonia 
arguing a breach in the scope of competences assumed by the Government of Catalonia in matters 
of promotion and management of renewable energies and energy efficiency. The Constitutional 
Court ruled in favour of the Government of Catalonia and removed the provision that outlawed 
shared residential self-consumption from PV systems and supports the possibility of implementing 
self-consumption systems in residential areas and multi-apartment buildings where several users 
can benefit from them. The sentence highlights that these systems are a means to implement the 
nearly zero-energy buildings to which the European Union obliges after 2020.  
The Constitutional Court also stated that the State does not have the power to enrol and to manage 
the registration of the systems, which is under the competence of the autonomous communities. 
This means that the autonomous communities are responsible for regulating the shared self-
consumption systems and their registering system.  
However, there is currently a legal gap and any homeowners’ association could install their system 
without any regional regulation. It seems that the autonomous communities have different visions 
regarding the need to regulate shared self-consumption systems. While some autonomous 
communities analyse the possibility of having regional regulations to assure a greater legal security 
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for citizens who decide to share the energy they generate, other autonomous communities do not 
see the necessity for such a regulation.  
In addition, the Spanish Government has presented a new regulatory proposal that, among other 
measures, regulates technical and economically shared residential self-consumption. The draft 
regulates shared self-consumption whether the owner of the system is the consumer of the energy 
produced or not. This entails that the regulation accepts that the owner of the system supplies the 
energy to several consumers, opening a new business niche. However, the regulation establishes 
several restrictive elements. First, the self-consumption system must be in the same property 
registry number as the consumption point. Second, the electricity generated by the system will be 
distributed among consumers depending on the power they have contracted unless they reach a 
different agreement. This individual fee is paid every hour, so the that the energy that is not 
consumed every 60 minutes is injected into the network. Therefore, it is not possible to compensate 
some consumption points with others. Although in some cases the energy surplus can be sold, the 
imposition of an individual fee cancels the main advantage of sharing the same system, making the 
most of all the self-generated energy and avoiding having energy surpluses.  
The current situation for collective energy consumption from PV systems is very uncertain. 
Although after the sentence of the Constitutional Court shared residential self-consumption is 
allowed, the legal uncertainty and the unsecure regulatory environment is a barrier for collective 
action in this field (Velte, 2018) 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands lags behind the EU-27 average share of renewable within the total energy 
production capacity: 3.6% versus 8.7% (Eurostat, 2019). Van der Schoor and Scholtens (2014) 
conclude that CAIs in northern Netherlands are emergent organizations, still undergoing 
organizational development. There is still some lack of specificity of goals at the local level, and active 
citizen engagement in municipal energy plans. The difficulty is that institutional organization of the 
energy sector in the Netherlands has traditionally been market-oriented, and this has left little space 
for civil society to influence the energy transition through CAIs. The discourse in the Netherlands has 
predominately been about economic efficiency of the energy system, and this leaves little space for 
the emergence of CAIs that are motivated by environmental issues (Oteman et al., 2014). 
Historically, The Netherlands has exploited its gas fields, particularly in the North. In the effort to 
transition to a low carbon economy, regional governments are seeking to broaden their energy 
profiles (Hasanov and Zuidema, 2018). Local energy initiatives are beginning to emerge, motivated 
by increasing awareness of climate and global sustainability challenges, and a desire to foster more 
cohesion within communities. In the current legislation in The Netherlands, energy producers are 
responsible for VAT and energy taxes, unless the energy is produced beyond the personal meter. 
Energy communities are collectively lobbying to expand the tax exemption to apply to collective 
energy production (Dóci et al., 2015). 
Germany 
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In Germany, the Energiewende (energy transition) encapsulates the strategy of phasing out nuclear 
power in favor of renewable energy while maintaining economic growth. The strategy stipulates that 
the last nuclear power plant will be decommissioned in 2022 and that by 2050, renewables will 
constitute 60% of Germany’s energy portfolio. Currently, four firms control over 80% of the market 
for fossil and nuclear-based energy (Oteman et al., 2014). Of the renewable-based energy in Germany, 
nearly half is owned by private households, cooperatives or farmers. The largest group of energy 
cooperatives in Germany are based on solar energy and this has increased rapidly since 2007. There 
are also a few (45) wind cooperatives that began in the 1990s with a feed in tariff, and they therefore 
have a longer institutional legacy (Oteman et al., 2014). 
The Energiewende has created a ‘window of opportunity’ for the CAIs that can align their visions 
within the new state strategy (Oteman et al., 2014). As such, this places challenges on local regions 
to develop energy self-sufficiency. While many regional authorities see a political opportunity for 
strengthening regulations, other non-governmental actors also are being mobilized: famers who can 
provide biomass or space for new wind turbines, prosumer networks, and green energy investors 
(Moss et al., 2015).  
The Energiewende has had the effect of shifting institutions in villages, towns and regions. The 
Energiewende was not simply a top-down policy rollout; it promoted action from local institutions 
who saw an opportunity to benefit (or at least avoid harm) from the new initiative. This has led to 
not only a proliferation of energy cooperatives within Germany, but also to traditional energy service 
providers and mining firms to seek alliances with existing institutions to protect their interests, 
resulting in complicated power structures and a patchwork of infrastructure ownership. This mix of 
top-down and bottom-up agendas has generated heterogeneous actor constellations (Moss et al., 
2015). 
Moreover, German law allows citizens to found energy collectives rather easily, and German citizens 
have a fair amount of disposable income with which to invest collectively in local energy projects. 
Finally, there is well-developed cultural attachment to a homeland in Germany, which can strengthen 
the social aspect of local energy communities (Magnani and Osti, 2016). 
United Kingdom 
Community energy projects are seen as essential to sustainable energy transition and are supported 
by national policies of different party coalitions within the UK. Many policies seek to catalyze the role 
of CAIs, across Scotland, Wales, and England, through education campaigns, building energy 
efficiency, and energy communities (Seyfang et al., 2013). 
According to Seyfang and Haxltine (2012), the Transition Towns movement in the UK is a movement 
instantiated by the twin sustainable development challenges of climate change and peak oil, and thus 
the need to divest from fossil fuels. Thus far, the Transition Towns movement in the UK has been 
largely successful in replicating their model to different communities internationally. However, they 
have seen less success in scaling up their activities to a larger membership base within the 
communities. It is also too early to tell what degree of success they have had in translating their 
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efforts to address other sustainability goals and initiatives, largely due to challenges of attracting 
wider interest, funding, and maintaining momentum. The authors found the Transition Towns often 
struggled with their visions, creating ambitions that were not necessarily achievable or realistic, and, 
at the same time, as a hierarchical accrediting institution they have remained vigilant about trying to 
protect the Transitions Town ‘brand’ from failed projects. The learning aspect has at times stagnated 
with awareness raising films that fail to draw in new local members. Nevertheless, the Transition 
Towns movement has grown rapidly, and has links to other voluntary organizations, social 
enterprises, and political parties (Seyfang and Haxeltine, 2012). 
Italy 
Hydroelectric power has traditionally been the most important renewable energy source in Italy, 
though this source has not expanded since the 1950s (Magnani and Osti, 2016). More recently, since 
2009, solar voltaic installations have increased dramatically as a result of a generous feed-in-tariff. 
There are over half a million solar photovoltaic producers in Italy now (Magnani and Osti, 2016). 
With the liberalization of the energy system, new land-use tensions arose between agricultural 
biogas facilities, wind parks, and solar photovoltaic plants. As civil society becomes more mobilized 
in the energy transition, land-use is becoming the most frequent type of environmental controversy 
within Italy (Magnani and Osti, 2016). Though the energy market in Italy is still controlled by a few 
large firms, the energy CAIs have nevertheless continued to expand, including prosumer networks 
and energy purchasing associations. Despite this, the influence of energy communities on the 
sustainable energy transition in Italy has been slow to take shape, especially when compared to 
Northern European countries. This is largely due to administrative and socio-economics conditions 
in Italy and the large amount of power and influence held by the small number of large firms in the 
energy sector. Moreover, the complex legal aspects of collective energy project ownership still 
present a significant barrier, requiring specialized legal competencies (Magnani and Osti, 2016). 
Finland 
Energy communities in Finland are renewable energy projects or energy savings projects that have 
links to community action. Community energy in Finland is driven by local communities investing in 
solar panels, and an initiative of the NGO Friends of the Earth Europe to promote energy prosumers 
(Ruggiero et al., 2018). The role of energy communities in Finland is small, though the National 
Energy and Climate Plan recognizes the benefits of distributed generation and local energy self-
sufficiency. However, there is limited policy support for local community energy production; the 
Finnish government has traditionally prioritized energy intensive industries. As such, investment 
grants are only available to companies, municipalities, and other similar legal entities, but not to 
individuals (Ruggiero et al., 2018).  
The authors also identified three types of collective energy projects in Finland: cost reduction 
initiatives (motivated to reduce energy costs and combat energy poverty), technical expertise 
projects (led by a few members to address particular technical problems with existing energy 
infrastructure in the community) and system change projects (aiming to create new ways for 
producing energy and living more sustainably). One of the largest barriers in the Finnish context is 
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the lack of a shared vision, and this prevents the scaling up of energy communities (Ruggiero et al., 
2018). 
4.5 First set of dimensions to be accounted for in the following project activities 
Based on sub-sections 4.1-4.4, a preliminary set of dimensions – to be later adapted to the specific 
research and engagement tools that will be used in the following phases of COMETS - is below 
identified to describe CAIs’ profile, development and effects. 
 
Interests and values: 
• Individual interests: e.g. saving money; energy self-management; energy security and 
autonomy; sociability. 
• Collective interests: e.g. sharing consumption and production; well-being improvement; 
environmental improvement; equality; solidarity; social inclusion; restoration of common 
goods; overcoming of prices as way to evaluate values. 
• Moral values: closeness to wilderness or nature; ecological awareness; pro-environment 
mobilization, etc. (here we underlie the morality of the actions taken by humanity as regards 
the transformation of both the natural environment and its own collective nature). 
Organisational process: 
• Membership structure: number of members; openness to new members (whether 
membership is restricted to specific groups and whether membership is voluntary or 
required for certain individuals); members characteristics (e.g. socio-demographic 
characteristics, in case of natural persons); geographical scope of the initiatives (in particular, 
whether citizens involved are geographically close to the project (local) or spread over wider 
territories (e.g. national)). 
• Types of activity: primary activity (whether energy production, energy consumption, energy 
services or a mix of those); characteristics of the projects implemented (e.g. technology type, 
plant size). 
• Dynamics of organization: timing of creation and development; proponent(s) of the initiative; 
approach adopted, e.g. bottom up approaches (cases in which the launch and development of 
the project are driven by citizens or other types of grassroots organizations) or top down 
approach (cases where is another institution, such a local authority or a private company, 
leading the process, defining the structural features of the project and facilitating/steering 
the project development and the citizens’ involvement).  
• Organisational structure: legal form of the project (e.g. cooperative, limited company or other 
forms); instrument offered to citizens (i.e. equity or debt); ownership and level of citizens’ 
involvement; organisational network (whether the CAI is part of a larger 
group/conglomerate or in turn owns subsidiaries itself). 
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• Distribution of benefits: collective aspect of benefit distribution (i.e. distribution to a single 
entity, only to members, to the external society); geographical aspect of benefit distribution 
(i.e. benefits for local society, or national/ international society). 
Mobilisation and resources’ control: 
• Financing structure: e.g. self-funding, bank loaning, cooperative funding or a combination of 
those. 
• Financial sustainability: e.g. duration of CAIs; sustainability of CAI goals beyond CAI 
existence; level of fulfilment of purpose. 
• Benefits provided: monetary benefits (e.g. returns on investment offered, including potential 
saving on electricity bills); non-monetary benefits (any other services and benefits accruing 
from the project, e.g. other energy or community services provided, collective control of 
benefits distribution). 
• Social innovation: e.g. jobs and wealth creation; energy poverty reduction; citizens 
participation and democratic empowerment; increased social acceptance of renewables; 
increased energy security; higher awareness of sustainable practices; challenging the status-
quo and existing social technical regimes; strengthened social networks and social 
movements; gender equality. 
 
Opportunities and threats: 
• Environmental motivation and commitment of key stakeholders. 
• Presence of clear and stable financial incentives framework. 
• Supportive norms and regulatory framework. 
• Presence of a supporting social environment (for example in terms of sharing a common 
identity and ideas). 
• Presence of a local/national cooperative tradition and of a community spirit.  
• Technological gaps: (e.g. stabilization of grid infrastructure). 
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5 Conclusions 
This deliverable has shown how vast is the issue of collective action and how it is quickly increasing 
when applied to the energy field. Rather than just merging all the contributions and perspectives 
explored in this deliverable, we proposed a preliminary framework that both helps in taking into 
consideration the diverse perspectives here explored and could support the development of the 
following stages of the COMETS project. The expectation is for a refinement of the framework itself 
on the basis of the next activities’ results, namely the evidences that will derive from WP2, WP3 and 
WP4. 
As a general remark, we can say that collective action is the most fundamental form of social reality. 
Every social institution, relation, practice, but also every good, service, and facility rests upon the 
capacity of groups of individuals to engage in various forms of collective intentional behavior. A 
preliminary understanding of the ‘social’ requires an understanding of the nature of collective agency 
and of how the various aspects of the social world are grounded in it (Ludwig, 2016). Thus, we can 
claim that collective action is foundational of any mode of existence, as well as of the individuals 
participating in it. In this perspective, the collective comes before the individual inasmuch 
individualization is a process that takes ground inside the collective itself. 
Referring here to what we introduced in Section 2, the first consequence of collective action is a 
collective good, and such a good, as in the case of energy, is non-excludable, not appropriable or 
eligible to be privatized for individual profit and utility: it can be privately consumed but without 
being subtracted to others. The collective action that produces new types of goods or commons, or is 
able to restore old commons that had been monopolized, captured by market forces or privatized, is 
social innovation. This ‘commonalization’ of energy is a process, implicitly innovative in itself, and 
able to push further innovative adaptation of the socio-economic structure. Therefore, the ambition 
is to explore collective action as a mean to put in motion, and then generate, collective goods such as 
energy – or, better, the different ways in which energy manifests - thus pushing social innovation. 
Social innovation thus results as the consequence of collective action and not as its premise.  
In short, the social relevance of CAIs for the energy transition comes from the fact that: from one side, 
it can be the trigger, or at least the accelerator, of this crucial transition; from the other side, it is also 
able to create new conditions for collective and cooperating behaviour, thus generating or reinforcing 
social innovation. Collective action implies a self-generation of motivations and interests, those that 
can be linked both to further innovation as well as to disappointment regarding certain ways to 
manage a material thing such as energy.  
Regarding the rising, diffusion and evolution of CAIs in the energy field, we identified some factors 
and dimensions (as listed in Section 4.5) that seem to play a crucial role. These can already provide 
a good, although provisional set of elements, that will be applied, and whose relevance will be tested, 
throughout next activities.  
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